Oligopoly Limit Pricing - Strategic Substitutes, Strategic Complements

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dc.contributor.author MARTIN, Stephen
dc.date.accessioned 2011-04-20T14:03:55Z
dc.date.available 2011-04-20T14:03:55Z
dc.date.issued 1995
dc.identifier.citation International Journal of Industrial Organization, 1995, 13, 1, 41-65
dc.identifier.issn 0167-7187
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/1814/16782
dc.description.abstract Conditions are outlined under which it is a sequential equilibrium for firms to forgo current profit to reduce the likelihood of entry, if firms are uncertain about rivals' costs. The assumptions about out-of-equilibrium beliefs that sustain such equilibria are more plausible if firms produce strategic substitutes than if firms produce strategic complements.
dc.title Oligopoly Limit Pricing - Strategic Substitutes, Strategic Complements
dc.type Article
dc.neeo.contributor MARTIN|Stephen|aut|
dc.identifier.volume 13
dc.identifier.startpage 41
dc.identifier.endpage 65
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dc.identifier.issue 1

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