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dc.contributor.authorMARTIN, Stephen
dc.date.accessioned2011-04-20T14:03:55Z
dc.date.available2011-04-20T14:03:55Z
dc.date.issued1995
dc.identifier.citationInternational Journal of Industrial Organization, 1995, 13, 1, 41-65
dc.identifier.issn0167-7187
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/16782
dc.description.abstractConditions are outlined under which it is a sequential equilibrium for firms to forgo current profit to reduce the likelihood of entry, if firms are uncertain about rivals' costs. The assumptions about out-of-equilibrium beliefs that sustain such equilibria are more plausible if firms produce strategic substitutes than if firms produce strategic complements.
dc.titleOligopoly Limit Pricing - Strategic Substitutes, Strategic Complements
dc.typeArticle
dc.neeo.contributorMARTIN|Stephen|aut|
dc.identifier.volume13
dc.identifier.startpage41
dc.identifier.endpage65
eui.subscribe.skiptrue
dc.identifier.issue1


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