| dc.contributor.author |
MARTIN, Stephen |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2011-04-20T14:03:55Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2011-04-20T14:03:55Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
1995 |
|
| dc.identifier.citation |
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 1995, 13, 1, 41-65 |
|
| dc.identifier.issn |
0167-7187 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://hdl.handle.net/1814/16782 |
|
| dc.description.abstract |
Conditions are outlined under which it is a sequential equilibrium for firms to forgo current profit to reduce the likelihood of entry, if firms are uncertain about rivals' costs. The assumptions about out-of-equilibrium beliefs that sustain such equilibria are more plausible if firms produce strategic substitutes than if firms produce strategic complements. |
|
| dc.title |
Oligopoly Limit Pricing - Strategic Substitutes, Strategic Complements |
|
| dc.type |
Article |
|
| dc.neeo.contributor |
MARTIN|Stephen|aut| |
|
| dc.identifier.volume |
13 |
|
| dc.identifier.startpage |
41 |
|
| dc.identifier.endpage |
65 |
|
| eui.subscribe.skip |
true |
|
| dc.identifier.issue |
1 |
|