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dc.contributor.authorMARCET, Albert
dc.contributor.authorMARIMON, Ramon
dc.date.accessioned2011-04-26T10:46:38Z
dc.date.available2011-04-26T10:46:38Z
dc.date.issued2011-01-01
dc.identifier.issn1830-7728
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/16815
dc.description.abstractWe obtain a recursive formulation for a general class of contracting problems involving incentive constraints. These constraints make the corresponding maximization sup problems non-recursive. Our approach consists of studying a recursive Lagrangian. Under standard general conditions, there is a recursive saddle-point (infsup) functional equation (analogous to a Bellman equation) that characterizes the recursive solution to the planner's problem and forward-looking constraints. Our approach has been applied to a large class of dynamic contractual problems, such as contracts with limited enforcement, optimal policy design with implementability constraints, and dynamic political economy models.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI MWPen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2011/03en
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subjectRecursive methodsen
dc.subjectdynamic optimizationen
dc.subjectRamsey equilibriumen
dc.subjecttime inconsistencyen
dc.subjectlimited participationen
dc.subjectcontract defaulten
dc.subjectsaddle-pointsen
dc.subjectLagrangian multipliersen
dc.titleRecursive Contractsen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.neeo.contributorMARCET|Albert|aut|
dc.neeo.contributorMARIMON|Ramon|aut|EUI70009
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