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dc.contributor.authorCALSAMIGLIA, Xavier
dc.contributor.authorKIRMAN, Alan
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-09T15:11:19Z
dc.date.available2011-05-09T15:11:19Z
dc.date.issued1993
dc.identifier.citationEconometrica, 1993, 61, 5, 1147-1172
dc.identifier.issn0012-9682
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/16939
dc.description.abstractIt is shown that any informationally decentralized mechanism that realizes fair allocations over the class of classical pure exchange environments has a message space of dimension no smaller than the number of agents times the number of commodities. Since the equal income Walrasian mechanism, in which all agents take prices parametrically and maximize utility subject to the average income constraint, realizes fair outcomes over the class of classical pure exchange environments and has a message space of that dimension it is informationally efficient. Further, it is shown that it is the unique informationally efficient mechanism realizing fair allocations.
dc.titleA Unique Informationally Efficient and Decentralized Mechanism with Fair Outcomes
dc.typeArticle
dc.neeo.contributorCALSAMIGLIA|Xavier|aut|
dc.neeo.contributorKIRMAN|Alan|aut|
dc.identifier.volume61
dc.identifier.startpage1147
dc.identifier.endpage1172
eui.subscribe.skiptrue
dc.identifier.issue5


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