A Unique Informationally Efficient and Decentralized Mechanism with Fair Outcomes

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dc.contributor.author CALSAMIGLIA, Xavier
dc.contributor.author KIRMAN, Alan
dc.date.accessioned 2011-05-09T15:11:19Z
dc.date.available 2011-05-09T15:11:19Z
dc.date.issued 1993
dc.identifier.citation Econometrica, 1993, 61, 5, 1147-1172
dc.identifier.issn 0012-9682
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/1814/16939
dc.description.abstract It is shown that any informationally decentralized mechanism that realizes fair allocations over the class of classical pure exchange environments has a message space of dimension no smaller than the number of agents times the number of commodities. Since the equal income Walrasian mechanism, in which all agents take prices parametrically and maximize utility subject to the average income constraint, realizes fair outcomes over the class of classical pure exchange environments and has a message space of that dimension it is informationally efficient. Further, it is shown that it is the unique informationally efficient mechanism realizing fair allocations.
dc.title A Unique Informationally Efficient and Decentralized Mechanism with Fair Outcomes
dc.type Article
dc.neeo.contributor CALSAMIGLIA|Xavier|aut|
dc.neeo.contributor KIRMAN|Alan|aut|
dc.identifier.volume 61
dc.identifier.startpage 1147
dc.identifier.endpage 1172
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dc.identifier.issue 5


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