dc.contributor.author | CHARI, V. V. | |
dc.contributor.author | JONES, L. E. | |
dc.contributor.author | MARIMON, Ramon | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-05-09T15:11:24Z | |
dc.date.available | 2011-05-09T15:11:24Z | |
dc.date.issued | 1997 | |
dc.identifier.citation | American Economic Review, 1997, 87, 5, 957-976 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0002-8282 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1814/16948 | |
dc.description.abstract | In U.S. elections, voters often vote for candidates from different parties for president and Congress. Voters also express dissatisfaction with the performance of Congress as a whole and satisfaction with their own representative. We develop a model of split-ticket voting in which government spending is financed by uniform taxes. The benefits from this spending are concentrated. While the model generates split-ticket voting, overall spending is too high only if the president's powers are limited. Overall spending is too high in a parliamentary system. Our model can be used as the basis of an argument for term limits. | |
dc.title | The Economics of Split-Ticket Voting in Representative Democracies | |
dc.type | Article | |
dc.identifier.volume | 87 | |
dc.identifier.startpage | 957 | |
dc.identifier.endpage | 976 | |
eui.subscribe.skip | true | |
dc.identifier.issue | 5 | |