Three Essays in Competition Policy
Title: Three Essays in Competition Policy
Author: MAGOS, Dimitrios
Series/Report no.: EUI PhD theses; Department of Economics
This thesis focuses on different aspects of Competition Policy and analyses questions related to market power, collusion and the European Commission's fining policy. The first chapter provides a theoretical setting to study a particular abuse of dominant position, known as margin (or price) squeeze. It explores the conditions under which margin squeeze arises as an equilibriumoutcome and discusses policy implications of introducing price squeeze testing. In the field of cartel detection, the leniency program has been instrumental in competition authorities' fight against cartels. This is the topic of the second paper, which examines the deterrence effect of the leniency program in a setup where all cartels are failing cartels. The third chapter provides an overview of the fining decisions of the European Commission in the field of antitrust. It analyses the incentives of firms to appeal Commission infringement decisions and examines whether the fining Guidelines have led to lower appeal rates, possibly through providing greater transparency in the way fines are set.
Defense Date: 5 May 2011; Jury Members: Prof. Massimo Motta, Supervisor, Universitat Pompeu Fabra Prof. Michele Polo, Università Bocconi Prof. Fernando Vega Redondo, EUI Prof. Nikolaos Vettas, Athens University of Economics and Business
Type of Access: openAccess