Bargaining efficiency in intergovernmental negotiations in the EU: Treaty of Nice vs. Constitutional Treaty
Title: Bargaining efficiency in intergovernmental negotiations in the EU: Treaty of Nice vs. Constitutional Treaty
Citation: Journal of European integration, 2006, 28, 4, 381-398
Two conditions have to be met for bargaining in Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs) in the EU to be efficient. On the one hand, an effective preparation of the negotiations is essential to provide governments with the necessary information to engage in issue linkages. On the other hand, mediation provided by the EU's Presidency is indispensable for the finding of compromises and for the elaboration of a final package deal. Systematic evidence from the IGCs of 2000 and of 2003-04 confirms the explanatory power of the article's argument. As a result of largely ineffective preparation and mediation during the IGC of 2000, the Treaty of Nice (2001) could not (or only provisionally) resolve many of the issues that had led to the convocation of the negotiations. In contrast, largely effective preparation and mediation enabled the far-reaching compromises included in the Constitutional Treaty (2004).
Subject: European studies; Bargaining; International conferences; Diplomacy; Treaties; Bargaining theory; Constitution; Europe
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