Internal Hierarchy and Stable Coalition Structures

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dc.contributor.author MORELLI, Massimo
dc.contributor.author PARK, In-Uck
dc.date.accessioned 2011-05-26T15:36:41Z
dc.date.available 2011-05-26T15:36:41Z
dc.date.issued 2011-01-01
dc.identifier.issn 1725-6704
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/1814/17579
dc.description.abstract When an agent decides whether to join a coalition or not, she must consider both i) the expected strength of the coalition and ii) her position in the vertical structure within the coalition. We establish that there exists a positive relationship between the degree of inequality in remuneration across ranks within coalitions and the number of coalitions to be formed. When coalition size is unrestricted, in all stable systems the endogenous coalitions must be mixed and balanced in terms of members' abilities, with no segregation. When coalitions must have a fixed finite size, stable systems display segregation by clusters while maintaining the aforesaid feature within clusters. en
dc.language.iso en en
dc.relation.ispartofseries EUI ECO en
dc.relation.ispartofseries 2011/20 en
dc.subject Stable Systems en
dc.subject Abilities en
dc.subject Hierarchy en
dc.subject Cyclic Partition en
dc.subject C71 en
dc.subject D71 en
dc.title Internal Hierarchy and Stable Coalition Structures en
dc.type Working Paper en
dc.neeo.contributor MORELLI|Massimo|aut|EUI70015
dc.neeo.contributor PARK|In-Uck|aut|


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