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dc.contributor.authorMORELLI, Massimo
dc.contributor.authorPARK, In-Uck
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-26T15:36:41Z
dc.date.available2011-05-26T15:36:41Z
dc.date.issued2011-01-01
dc.identifier.issn1725-6704
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/17579
dc.description.abstractWhen an agent decides whether to join a coalition or not, she must consider both i) the expected strength of the coalition and ii) her position in the vertical structure within the coalition. We establish that there exists a positive relationship between the degree of inequality in remuneration across ranks within coalitions and the number of coalitions to be formed. When coalition size is unrestricted, in all stable systems the endogenous coalitions must be mixed and balanced in terms of members' abilities, with no segregation. When coalitions must have a fixed finite size, stable systems display segregation by clusters while maintaining the aforesaid feature within clusters.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI ECOen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2011/20en
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subjectStable Systemsen
dc.subjectAbilitiesen
dc.subjectHierarchyen
dc.subjectCyclic Partitionen
dc.subjectC71en
dc.subjectD71en
dc.titleInternal Hierarchy and Stable Coalition Structuresen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.neeo.contributorMORELLI|Massimo|aut|EUI70015
dc.neeo.contributorPARK|In-Uck|aut|
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