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dc.contributor.authorMARIMON, Ramon 
dc.contributor.authorNICOLINI, Juan Pablo
dc.contributor.authorTELES, Pedro
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-08T13:37:49Z
dc.date.available2011-06-08T13:37:49Z
dc.date.issued2011
dc.identifier.issn1830-7728
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/17737
dc.descriptionA previous version of this paper was circulated with the title 'Competition and Reputation'. We would like to thank Fernando Alvarez, Huberto Ennis, Robert Lucas, David Levine, and an anonymous referee, for their comments, as well as the participants in the seminars and conferences where this work was presented.en
dc.description.abstractWe study the interplay between competition and trust as efficiency-enhancing mechanisms in the private provision of money. With commitment, trust is automatically achieved and competition ensures efficiency. Without commitment, competition plays no role. Trust does play a role but requires a bound on efficiency. Stationary inflation must be non-negative and, therefore, the Friedman rule cannot be achieved. The quality of money can only be observed after its purchasing capacity is realized. In that sense money is an experience good.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI MWPen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2011/06en
dc.relation.hasversionhttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/31177
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subjectCurrency competitionen
dc.subjectTrusten
dc.subjectInflationen
dc.subjectSustainable Equilibriumen
dc.subjectExperience goodsen
dc.subjectE40en
dc.subjectE50en
dc.subjectE58en
dc.subjectE60en
dc.titleMoney is an Experience Good: Competition and Trust in the Private Provision of Moneyen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.neeo.contributorMARIMON|Ramon|aut|EUI70009
dc.neeo.contributorNICOLINI|Juan Pablo|aut|
dc.neeo.contributorTELES|Pedro|aut|
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