Access Regulation, Entry, and Investment in Telecommunications

DSpace/Manakin Repository

Show simple item record

dc.contributor.author MANENTI, Fabio
dc.contributor.author SCIALÀ, Antonio
dc.date.accessioned 2011-06-24T10:02:21Z
dc.date.available 2011-06-24T10:02:21Z
dc.date.issued 2011-06-24
dc.identifier.issn 1028-3625
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/1814/17975
dc.description.abstract This paper presents a model of competition between an incumbent and an entrant firm in telecommunications. The entrant has the option to enter the market with or without having preliminary invested in its own infrastructure; in case of facility based entry, the entrant has also the option to invest in the provision of enhanced services. In case of resale based entry the entrant needs access to the incumbent network. Unlike the rival, the incumbent has always the option to upgrade the existing network to provide advanced services. We study the impact of access regulation on the type of entry and on firms' investments. Without regulation, we find that the incumbent sets the access charge to prevent resale based entry and this overstimulates rival's investment that may turn out to be socially inefficient. Access regulation may discourage welfare enhancing investments, thus also inducing a socially inefficient outcome. We extend the model to account for negotiated interconnection in case of facilities based entry. en
dc.language.iso en en
dc.relation.ispartofseries EUI RSCAS en
dc.relation.ispartofseries 2011/37 en
dc.relation.ispartofseries Florence School of Regulation en
dc.subject telecommunications en
dc.subject ladder of investment en
dc.subject access regulation en
dc.subject interconnection en
dc.title Access Regulation, Entry, and Investment in Telecommunications en
dc.type Working Paper en


Files in this item

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record