Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorBENABOU, Roland
dc.contributor.authorTIROLE, Jean
dc.date.accessioned2011-07-14T09:54:00Z
dc.date.available2011-07-14T09:54:00Z
dc.date.issued2011-01-01
dc.identifier.issn1830-7736
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/18135
dc.descriptionThe lecture was delivered on 16 February 2011. First draft: October 2010. This version: February 2011.en
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes how private decisions and public policies are shaped by personal and societal preferences ("values"), material or other explicit incentives ("laws") and social sanctions or rewards ("norms"). It first examines how honor, stigma and social norms arise from individuals' behaviors and inferences, and how they interact with material incentives. It then characterizes optimal incentivesetting in the presence of norms, deriving in particular appropriately modified versions of Pigou and Ramsey taxation. Incorporating agents' imperfect knowledge of the distribution of preferences opens up to analysis several new questions. The first is social psychologists' practice of "norms-based interventions", namely campaigns and messages that seek to alter people's perceptions of what constitutes "normal" behavior or values among their peers. The model makes clear how such interventions operate, but also how their effectiveness is limited by a credibility problem, particularly when the descriptive and prescriptive norms conflict. The next main question is the expressive role of law. The choices of legislators and other principals naturally reflect their knowledge of societal preferences, and these same "community standards" are also what shape social judgements and moral sentiments. Setting law thus means both imposing material incentives and sending a message about society's values, and hence about the norms that different behaviors are likely to encounter. The analysis, combining an informed principal with individually signaling agents, makes precise the notion of expressive law, determining in particular when a weakening or a strengthening of incentives is called for. Pushing further this logic, the paper also sheds light on why societies are often resistant to the message of economists, as well as on why they renounce certain policies, such as "cruel and unusual punishments", irrespective of effectiveness considerations, in order to express their being "civilized".en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI MWP LSen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2011/05en
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen
dc.subjectmotivationen
dc.subjectincentivesen
dc.subjectesteemen
dc.subjectreputationen
dc.subjecthonoren
dc.subjectstigmaen
dc.subjectsocial normsen
dc.subjectcultureen
dc.subjecttaxationen
dc.subjectlawen
dc.subjectpunishmentsen
dc.subjectnorms-based interventionsen
dc.subjectexpressive contenten
dc.titleLaws and Normsen
dc.typeOtheren
eui.subscribe.skiptrue


Files in this item

Icon

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record