Lexicographic Voting

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dc.contributor.author KLINGELHÖFER, Jan
dc.date.accessioned 2011-07-26T10:22:35Z
dc.date.available 2011-07-26T10:22:35Z
dc.date.issued 2011-01-01
dc.identifier.issn 1830-7728
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/1814/18235
dc.description.abstract This paper reconsiders the division of the literature on electoral competition into models with forwardlooking voters and those with backward-looking voters by combining ideas from both strands of the literature. As long as there is no uncertainty about voters' policy preferences and parties can commit in advance to a policy platform but not to a maximal level of rent extraction, voters can limit rents to the same extent as in a purely backward-looking model. At the same time, the policy preferred by the median voter is implemented as in a standard forward-looking model of political competition on an ideological policy dimension. Voters achieve this outcome by following a simple lexicographic voting strategy. They cast their vote in favor of their preferred policy position, but make their vote dependent on the incumbent parties' performance in office whenever they are indifferent. When uncertainty about the bliss point of the median voter is introduced into the model, voters have to accept higher rent payments, but they still retain some control over rent extraction. en
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso en en
dc.relation.ispartofseries EUI MWP en
dc.relation.ispartofseries 2011/17 en
dc.rights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subject Elections en
dc.subject Accountability en
dc.subject Downsian Competition en
dc.subject Voting en
dc.subject D72 en
dc.title Lexicographic Voting en
dc.type Working Paper en
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