Abstract:
Recent debates about “spheres of influence” in the context of the corporate responsibility to respect
human rights raised the question of whether companies’ human rights responsibilities arise, in part,
from their leverage—their ability to influence the actions of others through their relationships. Special
Representative John Ruggie rejected this proposition in the UN Framework for business and human
rights. I argue, on the contrary, that leverage is a source of responsibility where there is a morally
significant connection between the company and a rights-holder or rights-violator, the company is able
to make an appreciable contribution to ameliorating the situation, it can do so at modest cost, and the
threat to the rights-holder’s human rights is substantial. In such circumstances companies have a
responsibility to exercise leverage even though they did nothing to contribute to the situation. Such
responsibility is qualified, not categorical; graduated, not binary; context-specific; practicable;
consistent with the specialized social role of business; and not merely a negative responsibility to
avoid harm but a positive responsibility to do good.
