Social Security and Risk Sharing

DSpace/Manakin Repository

Show simple item record

dc.contributor.author GOTTARDI, Piero
dc.contributor.author KUBLER, Felix
dc.date.accessioned 2011-11-04T11:31:37Z
dc.date.available 2011-11-04T11:31:37Z
dc.date.issued 2011-01-01
dc.identifier.citation Journal of Economic Theory, 2011, 146, 3, 1078-1106 en
dc.identifier.issn 1095-7235
dc.identifier.issn 0022-0531
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/1814/19017
dc.description.abstract In this paper we identify conditions under which the introduction of a pay-as-you-go social security system is ex ante Pareto-improving in a stochastic OLG economy with capital accumulation and land. We argue that these conditions are consistent with realistic specifications of the parameters of the economy. In our model financial markets are complete and competitive equilibria interim Pareto efficient. Therefore, a welfare improvement can only be obtained if agents' welfare is evaluated ex ante, and arises from an improvement in intergenerational risk sharing. We also examine the optimal size of a given social security system as well as its optimal reform. en
dc.language.iso en en
dc.relation.ispartof Journal of Economic Theory en
dc.subject Intergenerational risk sharing en
dc.subject Social security en
dc.subject Ex ante welfare improvements en
dc.subject Social security reform en
dc.subject Price effects en
dc.title Social Security and Risk Sharing en
dc.type Article en
dc.identifier.doi 10.1016/j.jet.2010.10.014
dc.neeo.contributor GOTTARDI|Piero|aut|EUI70004
dc.neeo.contributor KUBLER|Felix|aut|
dc.identifier.volume 146 en


Files in this item

Files Size Format View

There are no files associated with this item.

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record