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dc.contributor.authorGOTTARDI, Piero
dc.contributor.authorKUBLER, Felix
dc.date.accessioned2011-11-04T11:31:37Z
dc.date.available2011-11-04T11:31:37Z
dc.date.issued2011-01-01
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Economic Theory, 2011, 146, 3, 1078-1106en
dc.identifier.issn1095-7235
dc.identifier.issn0022-0531
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/19017
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we identify conditions under which the introduction of a pay-as-you-go social security system is ex ante Pareto-improving in a stochastic OLG economy with capital accumulation and land. We argue that these conditions are consistent with realistic specifications of the parameters of the economy. In our model financial markets are complete and competitive equilibria interim Pareto efficient. Therefore, a welfare improvement can only be obtained if agents' welfare is evaluated ex ante, and arises from an improvement in intergenerational risk sharing. We also examine the optimal size of a given social security system as well as its optimal reform.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Economic Theoryen
dc.subjectIntergenerational risk sharingen
dc.subjectSocial securityen
dc.subjectEx ante welfare improvementsen
dc.subjectSocial security reformen
dc.subjectPrice effectsen
dc.titleSocial Security and Risk Sharingen
dc.typeArticleen
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jet.2010.10.014
dc.neeo.contributorGOTTARDI|Piero|aut|EUI70004
dc.neeo.contributorKUBLER|Felix|aut|
dc.identifier.volume146en


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