Browsing Department of Economics (ECO) by Subject "C72"

Now showing items 1-19 of 19

Title:Targeting interventions in networks Author(s):GALEOTTI, Andrea; GOLUB, Benjamin; GOYAL, SanjeevDate:2018Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI ECO; 2018/01Abstract:Individuals interact strategically with their network neighbors. A planner can shape incentives in pursuit of an aggregate goal, such as maximizing welfare or minimizing volatility. We analyze a variety of targeting problems ...
Title:Can there be a market for cheap-talk information? : some experimental evidence Author(s):CABRALES, Antonio; FERI, Francesco; GOTTARDI, Piero; MELÉNDEZ-JIMÉNEZ, Miguel A.Date:2016Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI ECO; 2016/07Abstract:This paper reports on experiments testing the viability of markets for cheap talk information. We find that these markets are fragile. The reasons are surprising given the previous experimental results on cheap-talk games. ...
Title:Group formation, in-group bias and the cost of cheating Author(s):MICHAELI, MotiDate:2015Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI MWP; 2015/04Abstract:Group formation and in-group bias -- preferential treatment for insiders -- are widely observed social phenomena. This paper demonstrates how they arise naturally when people incur a psychological cost as the result of ...
Title:Characterization and uniqueness of equilibrium in competitive insurance Author(s):FARINHA LUZ, VitorDate:2015Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI MWP; 2015/15Abstract:This paper provides a complete characterization of equilibria in a game-theoretic version of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)’s model of competitive insurance. I allow for stochastic contract offers by insurance firms and ...
Title:The hidden costs of tax evasion : collaborative tax evasion in markets for expert services Author(s):BALAFOUTAS, Loukas; BECK, Adrian; KERSCHBAMER, Rudolf; SUTTER, MatthiasDate:2014Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI ECO; 2014/01Abstract:In markets where transactions are governed by contractual incompleteness, revealed intentions to evade taxes may affect market performance. We experimentally examine the impact of tax evasion attempts on the performance ...
Title:Car mechanics in the lab : investigating the behavior of real experts on experimental markets for credence goods Author(s):BECK, Adrian; KERSCHBAMER, Rudolf; QIU, Jianying; SUTTER, MatthiasDate:2014Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI ECO; 2014/02Abstract:Credence goods, such as car repairs or medical services, are characterized by severe informational asymmetries between sellers and consumers, leading to fraud in the form of provision of insufficient service (undertreatment), ...
Title:Risk-sharing and contagion in networks Author(s):CABRALES, Antonio; GOTTARDI, Piero; VEGA-REDONDO, FernandoDate:2013Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI ECO; 2013/01Abstract:The aim of this paper is to investigate how the capacity of an economic system to absorb shocks depends on the specific pattern of interconnections established among financial firms. The key trade-off at work is between ...
Title:The Pro-Competitive Effect of Campaign Limits in Non-Majoritarian Elections Author(s):IARYCZOWER, Matias; MATTOZZI, AndreaDate:2012Citation:Economic Theory, 2012, 49, 3, 591-619Type:ArticleAbstract:We study a model of elections in non-majoritarian systems that captures the link between competition in policies and competition in campaign spending. We argue that the overall competitiveness of the political arena depends ...
Title:The Structure of the Lattices of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria of Binary Games of Strategic Complements Author(s):RODRIGUEZ BARRAQUER, TomasDate:2012Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI MWP; 2012/24Abstract:It has long been established in the literature that the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria of any binary game of strategic complements among a set N of players can be seen as a lattice on the set of all subsets of N under ...
Title:Envy can promote more equal division in alternating-offer bargaining Author(s):KOHLER, StefanDate:2012Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI ECOAbstract:Bargainers in an open-ended alternating-offer bargaining situation may perceive envy, a utility loss caused by receiving the smaller share that is modeled in some social preferences in addition to self-interest. I extend ...
Title:Strategic Mass Killings Author(s):ESTEBAN, Joan; MORELLI, Massimo; ROHNER, DominicDate:2010Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI ECO; 2010/23Abstract:Since World War II there have been about fifty episodes of large-scale mass killings of civilians and massive forced displacements. They were usually meticulously planned and independent of military goals. We provide a ...
Title:Natural Resource Distribution and Multiple Forms of Civil War Author(s):MORELLI, Massimo; ROHNER, DominicDate:2010Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI ECO; 2010/33Abstract:We examine how natural resource location, rent sharing and fighting capacities of different groups matter for ethnic con.ict. A new type of bargaining failure due to multiple types of potential conflicts (and hence multiple ...
Title:Markets for Information: Of Inefficient Firewalls and Efficient Monopolies Author(s):CABRALES, Antonio; GOTTARDI, PieroDate:2009Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI ECO; 2009/11Abstract:In this paper we study, within a formal model, market environments where information is costly to acquire and is of use also to potential competitors. Agents may then sell, or buy, reports over the information acquired and ...
Title:Network Games Author(s):GALEOTTI, Andrea; GOYAL, Sanjeev; JACKSON, Matthew O.; VEGA-REDONDO, Fernando; YARIV, LeeatDate:2008Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI ECO; 2008/07Abstract:In a variety of contexts - ranging from public goods provision to information collection - a player's well-being depends on own action as well as on the actions taken by his or her neighbors. We provide a framework to ...
Title:Structural holes in social networks Author(s):GOYAL, Sanjeev; VEGA-REDONDO, FernandoDate:2007Citation:Journal of Economic Theory, 2007, 137, 1, 460-492Type:ArticleAbstract:We consider a setting where every pair of players that undertake a transaction (e.g. exchange goods or information) creates a unit surplus. A transaction can take place only if the players involved have a connection. If ...
Title:Learning Strict Nash Equilibria through Reinforcement Author(s):IANNI, AntonellaDate:2007Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI ECO; 2007/21Abstract:Abstract: This paper studies the analytical properties of the reinforcement learning model proposed in Erev and Roth (1998), also termed cumulative reinforcement learning in Laslier et al. (2001). The stochastic model of ...
Title:Imitation and Selective Matching In Reputational Games Author(s):VIGNOLO, ThierryDate:2007Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI ECO; 2007/31Abstract:This paper investigates imitation and selective matching in reputational games with an outside option. We identify two classes of such games, which are ultimatum and trust games. By selective matching we mean that ...
Title:Friendship Selection Author(s):RIVAS, JavierDate:2007Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI ECO; 2007/08Abstract:We model the formation of friendships as repeated cooperation within a set of heterogeneous players. The model builds around three of the most important facts about friendship: friends help each other, there is reciprocity ...
Title:Inequality Aversion and Stochastic Decision-making: Experimental Evidence from Zimbabwean Villages after Land Reform Author(s):KOHLER, StefanDate:2007Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:GPRG Working Paper; 2006/61Abstract:Inequality considerations are a motive for making positive offers in the Ultimatum Game and rejecting small ones, but decision error could have the same effect. I find evidence for both of these considerations and a ...