Browsing Department of Economics (ECO) by Subject "D72"
Now showing items 1-8 of 8
-
Title:Public versus secret voting in committees Author(s):MATTOZZI, Andrea; NAKAGUMA, Marcos Y.Date:2016Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI ECO; 2016/08Abstract:This paper studies a committee decision-making problem. Committee members are heterogeneous in their competence, they are biased towards one of the alternatives and career oriented, and they can choose whether to vote or ... -
Title:The right type of legislator : a theory of taxation and representation Author(s):MATTOZZI, Andrea; SNOWBERG, ErikDate:2015Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI ECO; 2015/03Abstract:Theories of taxation conclude that legislators' ability to target redistribution to their districts’ results in higher government spending and taxation. Yet, despite the fact that securing “pork” is an important part of a ...
-
Title:Turnout and Policy: The role of candidates Author(s):VALASEK, Justin MattiasDate:2012Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI MWP; 2012/18Abstract:Turnout is an important determinant of which candidate wins an election. Since candidates know this, it follows that they will consider turnout when choosing their policy platforms. In this paper I formally examine the ...
-
Title:The Pro-Competitive Effect of Campaign Limits in Non-Majoritarian Elections Author(s):IARYCZOWER, Matias; MATTOZZI, AndreaDate:2012Citation:Economic Theory, 2012, 49, 3, 591-619Type:ArticleAbstract:We study a model of elections in non-majoritarian systems that captures the link between competition in policies and competition in campaign spending. We argue that the overall competitiveness of the political arena depends ...
-
Title:Pork Versus Public Goods: An Experimental Study of Public Good Provision Within a Legislative Bargaining Framework Author(s):FRÉCHETTE, Guillaume R.; KAGEL, John H.; MORELLI, MassimoDate:2010-01-01Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI ECO; 2010/37Abstract:We experimentally investigate a legislative bargaining model with both public and particularistic goods. Consistent with the qualitative implications of the model: There is near exclusive public good provision in the pure ...
-
Title:Turnout and Power Sharing Author(s):HERRERA, Helios; MORELLI, MassimoDate:2010Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI ECO; 2010/12Abstract:Differences in electoral rules and/or legislative, executive or legal institutions across countries induce different mappings from election outcomes to distributions of power. We explore how these different mappings affect ...
-
Title:Rent Seeking, Market Structure and Growth Author(s):BROU, Daniel; RUTA, MicheleDate:2007Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI ECO; 2007/03Abstract:We construct a model where firms compete in both political and economic markets. In political markets, firms compete for influence over government transfer policy (rents). This activity can be beneficial for the firm, but ...
-
Title:Fixing the quorum : representation versus abstention Author(s):ZWART, SanneDate:2007Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI ECO; 2007/07Abstract:The majority of the participating voters in referenda does not necessarily reflect the majority of the whole population since voters can abstain. This paper shows that a quorum exists for which the outcome of the referendum ...