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Browsing Department of Economics (ECO) by Subject "D82"
Now showing items 1-9 of 9
Title:Financial Markets as a Commitment Device for the Government
Author(s):SIMON, JennyDate:2012Type of Publication:Working PaperSeries/Report no.:EUI MWPAbstract:How does the presence of financial markets shape the government's ability to implement social redistribution? Individuals do not typically constrain consumption to equal their net-of-tax income every period. Instead, access ...
Title:Optimal Debt Bias in Corporate Income Taxation
Author(s):SIMON, JennyDate:2012Type of Publication:Working PaperSeries/Report no.:EUI MWPAbstract:I present a rationale for a government to discriminate between debt and equity financing when taxing corporate income. For risk-averse entrepreneurs, equity generates more surplus than debt, because it provides financing ...
Title:Flexible Contracts
Author(s):GOTTARDI, Piero; TALLON, Jean Marc; GHIRARDATO, PaoloDate:2011-01-01Type of Publication:Working PaperSeries/Report no.:EUI ECOAbstract:This paper studies the costs and benefits of delegating decisions to superiorly informed agents relative to the use of rigid, non discretionary contracts. The main focus of the paper lies in the analysis of the costs of ...
Title:Revenue Comparison in Asymmetric Auctions with Discrete Valuations
Author(s):DONI, Nicola; MENICUCCI, DomenicoDate:2011-01-01Type of Publication:Working PaperSeries/Report no.:EUI ECOAbstract:We consider an asymmetric auction setting with two bidders such that the valuation of each bidder has a binary support. We prove that in this context the second price auction yields a higher expected revenue than the first ...
Title:Markets and Contracts
Author(s):BISIN, Alberto; GEANAKOPOLS, John; GOTTARDI, Piero; MINELLI, Enrico; POLEMARCHAKIS, HeraklesDate:2010Type of Publication:Working PaperSeries/Report no.:EUI ECOAbstract:Economies with asymmetric information are encompassed by an extension of
the model of general competitive equilibrium that does not require an explicit
modeling of private information. Sellers have discretion over ...
Title:Flexible Contracts
Author(s):GOTTARDI, Piero; TALLON, Jean Marc; GHIRARDATO, PaoloDate:2009Type of Publication:Working PaperSeries/Report no.:EUI ECOAbstract:This paper studies the costs and benefits of delegating decisions to superiorly informed agents relative to the use of rigid, non discretionary contracts. Delegation grants some flexibility in the choice of the action by ...
Title:Inventors and Impostors: An Economic Analysis of Patent Examination
Author(s):SCHUETT, FlorianDate:2009Type of Publication:Working PaperSeries/Report no.:EUI ECOAbstract:The objective of patent examination is to separate the wheat from the chaff. Good applications - those satisfying the patentability criteria, particularly novelty and nonobviousness - should be accepted, while bad applications ...
Title:Does the Good Matter? Evidence on Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection from Consumer Credit Market
Author(s):BICAKOVA, AlenaDate:2007Type of Publication:Working PaperSeries/Report no.:EUI ECOAbstract:Default rates on instalment loans vary with type of the good purchased.
Using an Italian dataset of instalment loans between 1995-1999, we first
show that the variation persists even after controlling for contract ...
Title:Asset Based Unemployment Insurance
Author(s):RENDAHL, PontusDate:2007Type of Publication:Working PaperSeries/Report no.:EUI ECOAbstract:This paper studies a model of optimal redistribution policies in which agents
face unemployment risk and in which savings may provide partial self-insurance. Moral
hazard arises as job search effort is unobservable. The ...