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Browsing Department of Economics (ECO) by Subject "J64"
Now showing items 1-5 of 5
Title:Claiming Social Security Benefits Early to Retire Later
Author(s):FAWAZ, YarineDate:2012Type of Publication:Working PaperSeries/Report no.:EUI MWPAbstract:This paper examines Social Security benefit claiming behavior in the US using the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) to implement a duration model. It focuses essentially on the rushing/delaying behavior of the unemployed ...
Title:Technology Adoption, Turbulence and the Dynamics of Unemployment
Author(s):DUERNECKER, GeorgDate:2008Type of Publication:Working PaperSeries/Report no.:EUI ECOAbstract:The divergence of unemployment rates between the U.S. and Europe coincided
with a substantial acceleration in capital-embodied technical change in the late 70’s.
Furthermore, evidence suggests that European economies ...
Title:Reassessing Labor Market Reforms: Temporary Contracts as a Screening Device
Author(s):FACCINI, RenatoDate:2008Type of Publication:Working PaperSeries/Report no.:EUI ECOAbstract:Standard models of temporary contracts are either inconclusive, or fail to ac-
count for the positive correlation between temporary contracts and the employ-
ment rate, and for the high transition rates into permanent ...
Title:Unemployment and Within-Group Wage Inequality: Can Information Explain the Trade-Off?
Author(s):FACCINI, RenatoDate:2007Type of Publication:Working PaperSeries/Report no.:EUI ECOAbstract:In Italy, following WWII, speci c hiring procedures were developed that prevented rms from screening workers. More in particular, these institutions char-
acterized the Italian labor market with respect to the US labor ...
Title:Asset Based Unemployment Insurance
Author(s):RENDAHL, PontusDate:2007Type of Publication:Working PaperSeries/Report no.:EUI ECOAbstract:This paper studies a model of optimal redistribution policies in which agents
face unemployment risk and in which savings may provide partial self-insurance. Moral
hazard arises as job search effort is unobservable. The ...