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Browsing Department of Economics (ECO) by Subject "Limited commitment"
Now showing items 1-4 of 4
Title:Financial Crisis Resolution
Author(s):SCHROTH, JosefDate:2012Type of Publication:Working PaperSeries/Report no.:EUI MWPAbstract:This paper studies a dynamic version of the Holmstrom-Tirole model of intermediated finance. I show that competitive equilibria are not constrained efficient when the economy experiences a financial crises. A pecuniary ...
Title:Banking Panics and Policy Responses
Author(s):ENNIS, Huberto M.; KEISTER, ToddDate:2010Type of Publication:ArticleAbstract:When policy makers have limited commitment power, self-fulfilling bank runs can arise as an equilibrium phenomenon. We study how such banking panics unfold in a version of the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model. A run in this ...
Title:Competition, Human Capital and Income Inequality with Limited Commitment
Author(s):MARIMON, Ramon; QUADRINI, VincenzoDate:2008Type of Publication:Working PaperSeries/Report no.:EUI MWPAbstract:We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model with two-sided limited commitment
to study how barriers to competition, such as restrictions to business start-up, affect the
incentive to accumulate human capital. We show ...
Title:Competition, Human Capital and Income Inequality with Limited Commitment
Author(s):MARIMON, Ramon; QUADRINI, VincenzoDate:2008Type of Publication:Working PaperSeries/Report no.:EUI ECOAbstract:We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model with two-sided
limited commitment to study how barriers to competition, such as restrictions
to business start-up, affect the incentive to accumulate human
capital. We show ...