Title:Acquisition of Information and Share Prices: An Empirical Investigation of Cognitive Dissonance
Author(s):ARGENTESI, Elena; LUETKEPOHL, Helmut; MOTTA, MassimoDate:2010Type of Publication:ArticleAbstract:This paper deals with the determinants of agents' acquisition of information. Our econometric evidence shows that the general index of Italian share-prices and the series of Italy's financial newspaper sales are cointegrated, ...
Title:Buyers' Miscoordination, Entry and Downstream Competition
Author(s):FUMAGALLI, Chiara; MOTTA, MassimoDate:2008Type of Publication:ArticleAbstract:This article shows that buyers' coordination failures might prevent entry in an industry with an incumbent firm and a more efficient potential entrant. If there were a single buyer, or if all buyers formed a central ...
Title:Mergers and national champions
Author(s):MOTTA, Massimo; RUTA, MicheleDate:2008Type of Publication:ArticleAbstract:The suspicion that national governments were in various forms promoting or defending domestic national champions (or discouraging foreign ones) arose in a long list of recent merger cases. This paper provides an analysis ...
Title:Exclusionary Pricing and Rebates When Scale Matters
Author(s):KARLINGER, Liliane; MOTTA, MassimoDate:2007Type of Publication:Working PaperSeries/Report no.:EUI ECOAbstract:We consider an incumbent firm and a more effcient entrant, both
offering a network good to several asymmetric buyers. The incumbent
disposes of an installed base, while the entrant has a network of size zero
at the ...
Title:Acquisition of Information and Share Prices: An Empirical Investigation of Cognitive Dissonance
Author(s):ARGENTESI, Elena; LUETKEPOHL, Helmut; MOTTA, MassimoDate:2006Type of Publication:Working PaperSeries/Report no.:EUI ECOAbstract:This paper deals with the determinants of agents’ acquisition of information.
Our econometric evidence shows that the general index of Italian
share-prices and the series of Italy’s financial newspaper sales are ...
Title:Exclusive Dealing and Entry, when Buyers Compete
Author(s):FUMAGALLI, Chiara; MOTTA, MassimoDate:2006Type of Publication:ArticleAbstract:Rasmusen et al. (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000) show that an incumbent monopolist might prevent entry of a more efficient competitor by exploiting externalities among buyers. We show that their results hold only when ...
Title:Efficiency Gains and Myopic Antitrust Authority in a Dynamic Merger Game
Author(s):MOTTA, Massimo; VASCONCELOS, HelderDate:2005Type of Publication:ArticleAbstract:This paper uses an endogenous coalition formation game to derive an upper bound to industry concentration. The proposed coalitional stability concept assumes that firms are endowed with foresight in that they look ahead ...
Title:Exclusive Dealing, Entry and Mergers
Author(s):MOTTA, Massimo; FUMAGALLI, Chiara; PERSSON, LarsDate:2005Type of Publication:Working PaperSeries/Report no.:CEPR discussion papers
Title:Competition Policy. Theory and Practice
Author(s):MOTTA, MassimoDate:2004Type of Publication:BookAbstract:This is the first book to provide a systematic treatment of the economics of antitrust (or competition policy) in a global context. It draws on the literature of industrial organisation and on original analyses to deal ...
