Title:Efficiency Gains and Myopic Antitrust Authority in a Dynamic Merger Game Author(s):MOTTA, Massimo; VASCONCELOS, HelderDate:2005Citation:
- International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2005, 24, 2, 227-250
Type:ArticleAbstract:This paper uses an endogenous coalition formation game to derive an upper bound to industry concentration. The proposed coalitional stability concept assumes that firms are endowed with foresight in that they look ahead ...
Title:Efficiency Gains and Myopic Antitrust Authority in a Dynamic Merger Game Author(s):MOTTA, Massimo; VASCONCELOS, HelderDate:2003Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI ECO; 2003/23
Title:Identical price categories in oligopolistic markets. Innocent behaviour or collusive practice? Author(s):MOTTA, Massimo; COURTY, Pascal; FABRA, Natalia; FUMAGALLI, ChiaraDate:2004Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:Italian Antitrust Authority
Title:Trade Secret Laws, Labour Mobility, and Innovation Author(s):MOTTA, Massimo; RONDE, ThomasDate:2002Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:CEPR Discussion Paper; 2002/3615
Title:Acquisition of Information and Share Prices: An Empirical Investigation of Cognitive Dissonance Author(s):ARGENTESI, Elena; LUETKEPOHL, Helmut; MOTTA, MassimoDate:2010Citation:
- German Economic Review, 2010, 11, 3, 381-396
Type:ArticleAbstract:This paper deals with the determinants of agents' acquisition of information. Our econometric evidence shows that the general index of Italian share-prices and the series of Italy's financial newspaper sales are cointegrated, ...
Title:Country Asymmetries, Endogenous Product Choice and the Timing of Trade Liberalization Author(s):CABRALES, Antonio; MOTTA, MassimoDate:2001Citation:
- European Economic Review, 2001, 45, 1, 87-107
Type:ArticleAbstract:We analyze the effects of trade liberalization on firms' decisions and profits in a vertical product differentiation model with countries which have different characteristics. Firms decide product specifications at the ...
Title:Buyers' Miscoordination, Entry and Downstream Competition Author(s):FUMAGALLI, Chiara; MOTTA, MassimoDate:2008Citation:
- Economic Journal, 2008, 118, 531, 1196-1222
Type:ArticleAbstract:This article shows that buyers' coordination failures might prevent entry in an industry with an incumbent firm and a more efficient potential entrant. If there were a single buyer, or if all buyers formed a central ...