Title:Intervention and peace Author(s):LEVINE, David K.; MODICA, SalvatoreDate:2018Citation:
- Economic policy, 2018, Vol. 33, No. 95, pp. 361-402
Type:ArticleAbstract:Intervention often does not lead to peace, but rather to prolonged conflict. Indeed, we document that it is an important source of prolonged conflicts. We introduce a theoretical model of the balance of power to explain ...
Title:Damned if you do and damned if you don't : two masters Author(s):DUTTA, Rohan; LEVINE, David K.; MODICA, SalvatoreDate:2018Citation:
- Journal of economic theory, 2018, Vol. 177, pp. 101-125
Type:ArticleAbstract:We study common agency problems in which two principals (groups) make costly commitments to incentives that are conditioned on imperfect signals of the agent's action. Our framework allows for incentives to be either rewards ...
Title:Collusion constrained equilibrium Author(s):DUTTA, Rohan; LEVINE, David K.; MODICA, SalvatoreDate:2018Citation:
- Theoretical economics, 2018, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 307-340
Type:ArticleAbstract:We study collusion within groups in noncooperative games. The primitives are the preferences of the players, their assignment to nonoverlapping groups, and the goals of the groups. Our notion of collusion is that a group ...