The most flattering statement regarding the Doha Round is that there is a lot of uncertainty surrounding its fate. The Doha Round, as originally designed and understood, is not an option anymore. Although a formula has been found to keep the ball rolling, at this stage it is impossible to predict what direction it will take. There exists a lack of leadership to conclude the round and it suffers from inherent birth defects. This absence of a conclusion might send the wrong message at a moment when the WTO is emerging as the only genuine forum of multilateral cooperation. Though this is not the first trade round in the history of the multilateral trading system and definitely not the only one that is taking longer than planned to complete, it is the first time that the round risks being ditched altogether. In all previous rounds, which were essentially ‘business’ deals, trading nations managed to come up with an agreement in the end. This is the first time that they have announced ‘we do it for development’, and they now risk delivering nothing. Something has got to give at this stage, and we are running out of time as far as options regarding ‘deliverables’ are concerned. The accent has correctly been placed on priority issues for the bottom billion. The WTO, even if this effort succeeds, will have to face some tough tests in the near future arising from issues which were not at all addressed during the Doha Round.

The disciplining of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) by the WTO has been ‘relaxed’ recently as a result of the new context (the Transparency Mechanism) within which notified PTAs are being multilaterally reviewed. This is probably a blessing for a number of reasons, including the success of the multilateral trading system in bringing tariffs down over the years (and the ensuing reduced trade diversion), the fact that modern PTAs deal with many non-trade issues as well (for which no WTO disciplines exist), and the recent empirical literature suggesting overall positive welfare implications for those participating in similar schemes. This paper discusses these and other reasons to support the view that the WTO should rather focus on the multilateral agenda instead of diverting its attention towards disciplining PTAs. In more concrete terms, this paper argues in support of the thesis that the Transparency Mechanism should not be simply a de facto substitute of the previous regime (where outlawing a PTA could not a priori be excluded), but the de jure new forum to discuss PTAs within the multilateral trading system, at least for the time being. A first do-no-harm-policy is one of the rationales for the thesis advocated here.

In his article, Privacy, Security and the Council Decision Framework 2008/977/JHA, Mario Viola de Azeveda Cunha explores the interplay of privacy and security. He considers the governmental desire for security as balanced against the individual belief in the privacy. He discusses whether the Council Decision Framework 2008/977/JHA complies with data protection principles and standards. Privacy, Security, and the Council Decision Framework 2008/977/JHA is an interesting examination on the important balance between individual and collective principles.