A Dynamic Incentive Mechanism for Transmission Expansion in Electricity Networks: Theory, Modeling and Application
Title: A Dynamic Incentive Mechanism for Transmission Expansion in Electricity Networks: Theory, Modeling and Application
Citation: The Energy Journal, 2011, 32, 1, 119-48
We propose a price-cap mechanism for electricity-transmission expansion based on redefining transmission output in terms of financial transmission rights. Our mechanism applies the incentive-regulation logic of rebalancing a two-part tariff. First, we test this mechanism in a three-node network. We show that the mechanism intertemporally promotes an investment pattern that relieves congestion, increases welfare, augments the Transco´s profits, and induces convergence of prices to marginal costs. We then apply the mechanism to a grid of northwestern Europe and show a gradual convergence toward a common-price benchmark, an increase in total capacity, and convergence toward the welfare optimum.
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