dc.contributor.author | ROSELLÓN, Juan | |
dc.contributor.author | WEIGT, Hannes | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-12-01T12:13:25Z | |
dc.date.available | 2011-12-01T12:13:25Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2011 | |
dc.identifier.citation | The Energy Journal, 2011, Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 119-148 | en |
dc.identifier.issn | 0195-6574 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1814/19464 | |
dc.description.abstract | We propose a price-cap mechanism for electricity-transmission expansion based on redefining transmission output in terms of financial transmission rights. Our mechanism applies the incentive-regulation logic of rebalancing a two-part tariff. First, we test this mechanism in a three-node network. We show that the mechanism intertemporally promotes an investment pattern that relieves congestion, increases welfare, augments the Transco´s profits, and induces convergence of prices to marginal costs. We then apply the mechanism to a grid of northwestern Europe and show a gradual convergence toward a common-price benchmark, an increase in total capacity, and convergence toward the welfare optimum. | en |
dc.language.iso | en | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | [Florence School of Regulation] | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | [Electricity] | en |
dc.title | A dynamic incentive mechanism for transmission expansion in electricity networks : theory, modeling and application | en |
dc.type | Article | en |
dc.identifier.volume | 32 | |
dc.identifier.startpage | 119 | |
dc.identifier.endpage | 148 | |
dc.identifier.issue | 1 | |