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dc.contributor.editorGLACHANT, Jean-Michel
dc.contributor.editorFINON, Dominique
dc.contributor.editorDE HAUTECLOCQUE, Adrien
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-01T12:27:35Z
dc.date.available2011-12-01T12:27:35Z
dc.date.issued2011
dc.identifier.citationCheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2011, Loyola de Palacio Series on European Energy Policyen
dc.identifier.isbn1849804796
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/19465
dc.description.abstractThis book fills a gap in the existing literature by dealing with several issues linked to long-term contracts and the efficiency of electricity markets. These include the impact of long-term contracts and vertical integration on effective competition, generation investment in risky markets, and the challenges for competition policy principles. On the one hand, long-term contracts may contribute to lasting generation capability by allowing for a more efficient allocation of risk. On the other hand, they can create conditions for imperfect competition and thus impair short-term efficiency. The contributors - prominent academics and policy experts with inter-disciplinary perspectives - develop fresh theoretical and practical insights on this important concern for current electricity markets. This highly accessible book will strongly appeal to both academic and professional audiences including scholars of industrial, organizational and public sector economics, and competition and antitrust law. It will also be of value to regulatory and antitrust authorities, governmental policymakers, and consultants in electricity law and economics.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherEdward Elgaren
dc.relation.ispartofseriesLoyola de Palacio Programme on Energy Policy
dc.titleCompetition, Contracts and Electricity Markets: A new perspectiveen
dc.typeBooken


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