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2012
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Contribution to book
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2011
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Contribution to book
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2012
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Contribution to book
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View Abstract
The Internet has largely been greeted as a technology able to create new spaces of political debate. In order to investigate the issue, scholars have paid attention to how transnational social movements use new information technologies. This has been done mainly exploring the use of the World Wide Web (WWW). However, new political spaces do not take place just on the WWW, and by consequence, research in this field cannot solely carry out Web analysis to explore the role played by the Internet in creating political debate. In looking at other areas of the Internet to understand the creation of new political space, other analytical approaches need to be adopted. The Internet also includes tools other than the WWW, such as E-Mailing Lists, Social Networks tools, Peer-to-Peer Networks, Instant Messaging tools, and so forth. This paper explores the role that E-Mailing Lists play in creating new political spaces. To explore if and how this happens, the author illustrates this crucial point with an analysis of the use of E-Mailing Lists by social movements. The case used is that of the organization of the protest during the G8 Summit held in Genoa in July 2001.
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2012
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Contribution to book
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View Abstract
Respect for human rights and democratic principles have been regularly cited as an “essential element” of cooperation and relations between the European Union (EU) and non-EU countries in the Mediterranean. Since the 1990s onwards, numerous communications from the European Commission (EC) have stressed the need to integrate the so-called “essential-element” clause into the various agreements concluded with Mediterranean non-EU countries. When concluding their association agreements with the European Union, Mediterranean countries agreed to respect the “essential-element” clause. When the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) was introduced in 2004, the promotion of democracy and respect for human rights were presented as core values shaping the EU’s external action in non-EU countries. Despite the clear objectives mentioned in the ENP action plans, and the numerous dialogues designed to raise awareness of the need for democratic reforms and human rights, the promotion of democracy in Mediterranean non-EU countries has been, by all accounts, the least effective chapter of Euro-Med cooperation.
This lack of commitment has been denounced by various human rights organizations and associations. Likewise, the European Commission (EC) recognized on various occasions its failure in promoting the observance of human rights. This essay investigates how “essential” the human rights component has been compared with the diverse priorities contained in the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). It sets out to demonstrate that a subtle hierarchy of priorities has shaped EU policy options and perceptions making progress on human rights and democratization an issue of concern, but, at the same time, a dismissible priority in Euro-Mediterranean relations.
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2010
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Article
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View Abstract
Policy-makers in OECD countries appear to be increasingly concerned about growing migration pressure from developing countries. At the same, at least within Europe, they typically complain about the low level of internal labor mobility. In this chapter, we try to cast some light on the issues of both internal and external labor mobility. We investigate the link between development and migration and argue, on both theoretical and empirical grounds, that it is likely be nonlinear. More precisely, we find that, in a relatively poor sending country, an increase in income will have a positive impact on the propensity to migrate, even if we control for the income differential with the receiving country, because the financial constraint of the poorest become less binding. Conversely, if the home country is relatively better off, an increase in income may be associated with a fall in the propensity to migrate even for an unchanged income differential. Econometric estimation for Southern Europe over the period 1962–1988 provides substantial support to this approach. We estimate first the level of income for which the financial constraint is no more binding, around $950, and then the level of income for which the propensity to migrate declines, which is around $4,300 in 1985 prices. We therefore predict a steady decline in the propensity to migrate from Southern European countries. Similarly, our results highlight the possibility that the pressure to migrate from Northern African countries and other developing countries may increase with further growth.
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