Observer - Policeman - Pilot: On lacunae of legitimacy and the contradictions of financial crisis management in the European Union

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dc.contributor.author BIEBER, Roland
dc.date.accessioned 2011-12-19T14:49:34Z
dc.date.available 2011-12-19T14:49:34Z
dc.date.issued 2011
dc.identifier.issn 1725-6739
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/1814/19696
dc.description.abstract In matters of economic policy, the institutions of the European Union exercise uncoordinated functions of observer, policeman and pilot. Under normal circumstances the EU institutions act as observer of the economic policies of the Member States. This “soft law” approach contrasts sharply with their role to act as “policemen” and as a pilot, when excessive debts arise in the Member States. The contrast is illustrated by the "friendly advice", given to Greece in 2009 and the peremptory command addressed to this country in 2010/2011. A stable legal framework would require the elimination - or at least, attenuation - of the mismatch between the feeble powers to shape policy and the robustness of the powers to intervene in case of excessive public deficit and to impose policy sanctions. EU action needs to be targeted at an earlier stage in the process, so that ex post facto intervention with sanctions can be avoided. Furthermore, the present rules on EMU place at risk the legitimacy of both the EU and Member States. Neither national parliaments nor the European Parliament are involved in the shaping of and the decision on Recommendations for economic policy. In the longer term, there is no alternative: the EU will have to be granted powers to take binding decisions in the area of economic policy, and, in parallel, to reconfigure the decision-making system so that economic and social policy measures have democratic legitimacy. In any event, the only reliable “pilot” is the “institutional framework” as described in Article 13 of the TEU. en
dc.description.tableofcontents A. Introduction ........................................................................................................ 1 B. Structural Weaknesses of EU’s Economic Policy ....................................................................... 3 1. Does the Union Dispose of Adequate Tools for the Achievement of the Economic and Monetary Union? .................... 3 2. Insufficient Legitimacy of Economic Policy Decision ................................................................. 5 3. Is There Still a Common Aim? ........................................................................................ 6 4. Interim Conclusion .................................................................................................. 7 C. Which Reforms are Necessary in Order to Enhance Efficiency and Legitimacy of EMU ? .................................. 9 D. Concluding Remarks ...................................................................................................11 en
dc.language.iso en en
dc.relation.ispartofseries EUI LAW en
dc.relation.ispartofseries 2011/16 en
dc.subject Economic governance en
dc.subject Economic and Monetary Union en
dc.subject Legitimacy en
dc.subject Sanctions en
dc.subject EU Institutions en
dc.title Observer - Policeman - Pilot: On lacunae of legitimacy and the contradictions of financial crisis management in the European Union en
dc.type Working Paper en
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