Markets and Contracts

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dc.contributor.author BISIN, Alberto
dc.contributor.author GEANAKOPOLS, John
dc.contributor.author GOTTARDI, Piero
dc.contributor.author MINELLI, Enrico
dc.contributor.author POLEMARCHAKIS, Herakles
dc.date.accessioned 2012-01-11T12:08:37Z
dc.date.available 2012-01-11T12:08:37Z
dc.date.issued 2011
dc.identifier.citation Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2011, 47, 3, 279–288 en
dc.identifier.issn 0304-4068
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/1814/19838
dc.description This paper is a revised version of EUI ECO Working Paper 2010/29 en
dc.description.abstract Economies with asymmetric information are encompassed by an extension of the model of general competitive equilibrium that does not require an explicit modeling of private information. Sellers have discretion over deliveries on contracts; this is in common with economies with default, incomplete contracts or price rigidities. Competitive equilibria exist and anonymous markets are viable. But, for a generic economy, competitive equilibrium allocations are constrained suboptimal: there exist Pareto improving interventions via linear, anonymous taxes. en
dc.language.iso en en
dc.relation.ispartof Journal of Mathematical Economics en
dc.title Markets and Contracts en
dc.type Article en
dc.identifier.doi 10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.12.017
dc.neeo.contributor BISIN|Alberto|aut|
dc.neeo.contributor GEANAKOPOLS|John|aut|
dc.neeo.contributor GOTTARDI|Piero|aut|EUI70004
dc.neeo.contributor MINELLI|Enrico|aut|
dc.neeo.contributor POLEMARCHAKIS|Herakles|aut|
dc.identifier.volume 47 en


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