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dc.contributor.authorBISIN, Alberto
dc.contributor.authorGEANAKOPOLS, John
dc.contributor.authorGOTTARDI, Piero
dc.contributor.authorMINELLI, Enrico
dc.contributor.authorPOLEMARCHAKIS, Herakles
dc.date.accessioned2012-01-11T12:08:37Z
dc.date.available2012-01-11T12:08:37Z
dc.date.issued2011
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Mathematical Economics, 2011, 47, 3, 279–288en
dc.identifier.issn0304-4068
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/19838
dc.descriptionThis paper is a revised version of EUI ECO Working Paper 2010/29en
dc.description.abstractEconomies with asymmetric information are encompassed by an extension of the model of general competitive equilibrium that does not require an explicit modeling of private information. Sellers have discretion over deliveries on contracts; this is in common with economies with default, incomplete contracts or price rigidities. Competitive equilibria exist and anonymous markets are viable. But, for a generic economy, competitive equilibrium allocations are constrained suboptimal: there exist Pareto improving interventions via linear, anonymous taxes.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Mathematical Economicsen
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.titleMarkets and Contractsen
dc.typeArticleen
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.12.017
dc.neeo.contributorBISIN|Alberto|aut|
dc.neeo.contributorGEANAKOPOLS|John|aut|
dc.neeo.contributorGOTTARDI|Piero|aut|EUI70004
dc.neeo.contributorMINELLI|Enrico|aut|
dc.neeo.contributorPOLEMARCHAKIS|Herakles|aut|
dc.identifier.volume47en
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