What was the recipe for the success of Raiffeisen’s banking model? What made it possible for imitations of this German rural cooperative microfinance institution to work well in some European countries, but fail in others? This paper answers these questions with a comparison of Raiffeisenism in Ireland and the Netherlands. Raiffeisen banks arrived in both places at the same time, but had drastically different fates. In Ireland they were almost wiped out by the early 1920s, whilst in the Netherlands they proved to be a long-lasting institutional transplant. Raiffeisen banks were successful in the Netherlands because they operated in a niche market with few viable competitors. Meanwhile, rural financial markets in Ireland were unsegmented and populated by long-established incumbents, leaving little room for new players, whatever their perceived advantages. Whereas Dutch Raiffeisen banks were largely self-financing, closely integrated into the wider rural economy and took advantage of socioreligious division, their Irish counterparts did not.

This working paper argues on European Defense issues, considering a triple perspective: Past Legacy, Present Changes and Future Challenges. The first part looks at European defense from an historical perspective; from its European integration origins to the foundation of a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), reviewing its decade in existence. The second part analyzes the changes brought about by the Lisbon Treaty, as well as the most significant developments of a Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP): solidarity clauses, mission enlargement, European Defense Agency (EDA), news forms of cooperation, CSDP democratic control. Thirdly, this paper considers future challenges and concludes the need for new developments: at the institutional level, the strengthening of European defense parliamentary control through the creation of a CSDP inter parliamentary assembly and the EU´s external action inter and cross pillar coordination; at the capability level, the need to strengthen EDA and implement new cooperation mechanisms foreseen in the Lisbon Treaty; at the strategic level, the drive to clarify the EU´s international identity and define a new international strategy enabling the EU as a global security producer.

Alan S. Milward was an economic historian who developed an implicit theory of historical change. His interpretation which was neither liberal nor Marxist posited that social, political, and economic change, for it to be sustainable, had to be a gradual process rather than one resulting from a sudden, cataclysmic revolutionary event occurring in one sector of the economy or society. Benign change depended much less on natural resource endowment or technological developments than on the ability of state institutions to respond to changing political demands from within each society. State bureaucracies were fundamental to formulating those political demands and advising politicians of ways to meet them. Since each society was different there was no single model of development to be adopted or which could be imposed successfully by one nation-state on others, either through force or through foreign aid programs. Nor could development be promoted simply by copying the model of a more successful economy. Each nation-state had to find its own response to the political demands arising from within its society. Integration occurred when a number of nation–states shared similar political objectives which they could not meet individually but could meet collectively. It was not simply the result of their increasing interdependence. It was how and whether nation-states responded to these domestic demands which determined the nature of historical change.