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| Issue Date | View | Title | Author(s) | Type of Publication | Series/Report no. | Abstract |
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2012
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Working Paper
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EUI RSCAS; 2012/03; Global Governance Programme-12
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View Abstract
This working paper argues on European Defense issues, considering a triple perspective: Past Legacy, Present Changes and Future Challenges. The first part looks at European defense from an historical perspective; from its European integration origins to the foundation of a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), reviewing its decade in existence. The second part analyzes the changes brought about by the Lisbon Treaty, as well as the most significant developments of a Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP): solidarity clauses, mission enlargement, European Defense Agency (EDA), news forms of cooperation, CSDP democratic control. Thirdly, this paper considers future challenges and concludes the need for new developments: at the institutional level, the strengthening of European defense parliamentary control through the creation of a CSDP inter parliamentary assembly and the EU´s external action inter and cross pillar coordination; at the capability level, the need to strengthen EDA and implement new cooperation mechanisms foreseen in the Lisbon Treaty; at the strategic level, the drive to clarify the EU´s international identity and define a new international strategy enabling the EU as a global security producer.
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2012
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Working Paper
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EUI SPS; 2012/03
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View Abstract
The literature on ministerial careers has recently been reinvigorated by individual contributions and collaborative projects. However, few studies of ministerial careers have been able to take into account the varying importance of ministerial positions. Fewer still have taken ministerial careers as their unit of analysis. As a result, they have been unable to account for crucial aspects of these careers. This paper seeks to fill these gaps, linking a crossnational data set on ministerial appointments and terminations with country-specific expert survey data that estimate the importance of ministerial portfolios. Among the new possibilities opened up by this data set of 977 ministerial careers is the systematic description of the structure of ministerial careers incorporating measures of ministerial importance. The paper contributes to the study of ministerial careers by introducing several innovations: a simple analytical framework for the analysis of ministerial careers; a new, crossnational data set on ministerial appointments and terminations incorporting data on ministerial importance; an approach to dealing with the problem of unconfirmed right-censoring that is posed by studying ministerial careers; new approaches to describing and measuring ministerial career structures that the ministerial careers framework and the new data set open up; and an agenda for the future development and use of this new data set on ministerial careers.
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2012
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Working Paper
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EUI HEC; 2012/01
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View Abstract
Alan S. Milward was an economic historian who developed an implicit theory of historical change. His interpretation which was neither liberal nor Marxist posited that social, political, and economic change, for it to be sustainable, had to be a gradual process rather than one resulting from a sudden, cataclysmic revolutionary event occurring in one sector of the economy or society. Benign change depended much less on natural resource endowment or technological developments than on the ability of state institutions to respond to changing political demands from within each society. State bureaucracies were fundamental to formulating those political demands and advising politicians of ways to meet them. Since each society was different there was no single model of development to be adopted or which could be imposed successfully by one nation-state on others, either through force or through foreign aid programs. Nor could development be promoted simply by copying the model of a more successful economy. Each nation-state had to find its own response to the political demands arising from within its society. Integration occurred when a number of nation–states shared similar political objectives which they could not meet individually but could meet collectively. It was not simply the result of their increasing interdependence. It was how and whether nation-states responded to these domestic demands which determined the nature of historical change.
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2012
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Working Paper
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EUI SPS; 2012/02
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View Abstract
This article argues against two firmly-established ideas about the 1944 communist insurgency that led to the outbreak of civil war in postliberation Greece: (a) blame attribution to predominantly one actor, who, depending on each author’s ideological perspective, is either the Greek Communists or the British, and (b) outcome inevitability. Instead, the present analysis brings to the fore a set of no less than five distinct actors including, besides the original two, Prime Minister George Papandreou; Greece’s traditional political class; and the Greek monarch. Based primarily on the close reading of original documents, such as the personal accounts left behind by the protagonists of the civil war drama, and using causal inferences derived from counterfactual logic, this analysis shows that the Greek civil war would have been an inevitable outcome only if there were on the scene just two actors, the British and the Communists, directly confronting each other. Since however that was not the case, it is shown that Papandreou could have prevented civil war had he succeeded in both forging strategic alliances with the traditional political elites and embracing republicanism. His failure to implement either goal offers a novel interpretation of the Greek civil war, which also emphasizes the need for bringing leadership back into the study of civil war and other contentious politics phenomena. This is expected to foster our thinking about the dynamics leading to civil war outbreaks at the crucial meso-level, while also alerting us to the fact that civil wars are rarely inevitable and that they can be prevented by strategic leadership action.
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2012
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Working Paper
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EUI RSCAS; 2012/01; EUDO - European Union Democracy Observatory
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View Abstract
This paper, based on cross-regional empirical research, provides an integrated analytical framework for understanding the emergence of populism in seemingly different political contexts in both Europe (including Greece, France and the Netherlands) and Latin America (including Peru and Venezuela). It is found that, given an appropriate context, political leadership is the most important factor for setting in motion a number of interdependent causal mechanisms that may produce populism. Those mechanisms include the politicization of social resentment, the formation of new cleavage lines, and intense polarization. When successfully emergent, populism’s first and foremost outcome is the creation of new parties, or movements, of a distinctly personalist appeal. The causal explanation proposed in this paper is both parsimonious and credible. It also points to specific research themes related to successfully emergent populism.
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