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| Issue Date | View | Title | Author(s) | Type of Publication | Series/Report no. | Abstract |
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1997
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Working Paper
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Working papers (Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials); 1997/130
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1997
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Working Paper
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European integration online papers; 1997/01
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View Abstract
This paper presents a novel arrangement for the distribution of votes and the rules of decision-making in an enlarged European Union (EU). We make two assumptions: (1) that the EU is condemned to enlarge its membership in the near future; and (2) if it does this without changing the existing rules for voting in the Council of Ministers and distributing seats in the European Parliament, such an expanded EU would suffer severe distortions and disequilibria. However, if it were to adopt a new, simplified system that would combine arrangements for proportional proportionality in representation and concurrent majorities in decision-making, this impending dilemma could be avoided. Moreover, if these reforms were introduced sooner rather than later, they would be easier to agree upon, their impact would be phased in gradually, and their legitimacy could be stabilized in the face of far greater challenges in the future.
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1997
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Working Paper
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Nota di lavoro Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei; 1997/55
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1997
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Working Paper
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Estudios (Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales); 1997/96
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View Abstract
This paper presents a novel arrangement for the distribution of votes and the rules of decision-making in an enlarged European Union (EU). It starts from the observation that if one merely transposes the present arrangement for the EU of 15 member states to prospective EUs with from 17 to 35 members, the result would be a very substantial distortion of one of the EU’s most important “foundational principles,” namely, its method for weighing the voting power of members according to their size of population. Under existing rules for qualified majority voting, it takes 62 out of 87 votes in the Council of Ministers -- needless to say, voting as a single body -- or 71% of the total to pass a measure and 26 votes out of 87 (30%) to veto one. This means that the five largest countries (Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy and Spain) can veto decisions, but cannot produce a qualified majority without help from either the five medium-size countries (Netherlands, Greece, Belgium, Hungary and Sweden) or the five smallest countries (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland and Luxembourg). Hence, the small and medium countries together cannot possibly form a qualified majority without the five largest ones, but they are able collectively to veto a decision. In other words, for the actual system to work effectively, cooperation is needed between all three size categories and, hence, the results are likely to be consensual.
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1999
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Working Paper
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MPIfG discussion paper; 1999/01
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View Abstract
The paper presents a theoretical outline for a cross-national comparative study of business associations. It identifies two clusters of independent variables that are assumed to affect the structure of intermediary organizations: properties of the represented group ("Logic of Membership") and properties of the state and other political institutions such as trade unions ("Logic of Influence"). It goes on to develop a model of the organizational properties of business associations as they respond to these two logics and to other functional exigencies ("Logic of Goal Formation" and "Logic of Effective Implementation"). In a further step, the paper suggests four dimensions ("Domains", "Structures", "Resources", "Outputs") in which the "organizational development" of interest associations from lower to higher levels of "organizational complexity" and "strategic autonomy" can be studied.
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