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Title:Merger control procedures and institutions : a comparison of the EU and US practice Author(s):KOVACIC, William E.; MAVROIDIS, Petros C.
; NEVEN, Damien J.Date:2014Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI RSCAS; 2014/20; Global Governance Programme-84; Global EconomicsAbstract:The objective of this paper is to discuss and compare the role that different constituencies play in US and EU procedures for merger control. We describe the main constituencies (both internal and external) involved in ...
; NEVEN, Damien J.Date:2014Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI RSCAS; 2014/20; Global Governance Programme-84; Global EconomicsAbstract:The objective of this paper is to discuss and compare the role that different constituencies play in US and EU procedures for merger control. We describe the main constituencies (both internal and external) involved in ...
Title:Black cat, white cat : the identity of the WTO judges Author(s):JOHANNESSON, Louise; MAVROIDIS, Petros C.Date:2015Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI RSCAS; 2015/17; Global Governance Programme-161; Global EconomicsAbstract:WTO judges are proposed by the WTO Secretariat and elected to act as ‘judges’ if either approved by the parties to a dispute, or by the WTO Director-General in case no agreement between the parties has been possible. They ...
Date:2015Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI RSCAS; 2015/17; Global Governance Programme-161; Global EconomicsAbstract:WTO judges are proposed by the WTO Secretariat and elected to act as ‘judges’ if either approved by the parties to a dispute, or by the WTO Director-General in case no agreement between the parties has been possible. They ...
Title:A turquoise mess : green subsidies, blue industrial policy and renewable energy : the case for redrafting the subsidies agreement of the WTO Author(s):COSBEY, Aaron; MAVROIDIS, Petros C.Date:2014Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI RSCAS; 2014/17; Global Governance Programme-82; Global EconomicsAbstract:Canada-Renewable Energy presented the WTO Panel and Appellate Body (AB) with a novel issue: at the heart of the dispute was a measure adopted by the province of Ontario whereby producers of renewable energy would be paid ...
Date:2014Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI RSCAS; 2014/17; Global Governance Programme-82; Global EconomicsAbstract:Canada-Renewable Energy presented the WTO Panel and Appellate Body (AB) with a novel issue: at the heart of the dispute was a measure adopted by the province of Ontario whereby producers of renewable energy would be paid ...
Title:Bite the bullet : trade retaliation, EU jurisprudence and the law and economics of ‘taking one for the team’ Author(s):HOEKMAN, Bernard M. 
; MAVROIDIS, Petros C.Date:2013Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI RSCAS; 2013/32; Global Governance Programme-48; Global EconomicsAbstract:This paper discusses the Fedon case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which involved a claim for compensation by Fedon (an Italian producer of eye glass cases) from the EU for the imposition of WTO-authorized ...
; MAVROIDIS, Petros C.Date:2013Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI RSCAS; 2013/32; Global Governance Programme-48; Global EconomicsAbstract:This paper discusses the Fedon case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which involved a claim for compensation by Fedon (an Italian producer of eye glass cases) from the EU for the imposition of WTO-authorized ...
Title:Reaching out for green policies : national environmental policies in the WTO legal order Author(s):MAVROIDIS, Petros C.Date:2014Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI RSCAS; 2014/21; Global Governance Programme-85; Global EconomicsAbstract:The WTO does not squarely address the issue of jurisdictional ambit of national policies (affecting trade). And yet, absent some agreement as to what trading nations can and cannot do, the WTO loses much of its effectiveness. ...
Date:2014Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI RSCAS; 2014/21; Global Governance Programme-85; Global EconomicsAbstract:The WTO does not squarely address the issue of jurisdictional ambit of national policies (affecting trade). And yet, absent some agreement as to what trading nations can and cannot do, the WTO loses much of its effectiveness. ...
Title:MFN clubs and scheduling additional commitments in the GATT : learning from the GATS Author(s):HOEKMAN, Bernard M. ; MAVROIDIS, Petros C.Date:2016Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI RSCAS; 2016/06; Global Governance Programme-211; Global EconomicsAbstract:Scheduling additional commitments for policies affecting trade in goods in the GATT has been plagued by two sources of ambiguity: the treatment of changes introduced unilaterally by members subsequent to an initial commitment, ...
; MAVROIDIS, Petros C.Date:2016Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI RSCAS; 2016/06; Global Governance Programme-211; Global EconomicsAbstract:Scheduling additional commitments for policies affecting trade in goods in the GATT has been plagued by two sources of ambiguity: the treatment of changes introduced unilaterally by members subsequent to an initial commitment, ...
Title:Dispute settlement in the WTO (mind over matter) Author(s):MAVROIDIS, Petros C.Date:2015Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI RSCAS; 2015/34; Global Governance Programme-169; Global EconomicsAbstract:The WTO Dispute Settlement System aimed to curb unilateralism by establishing a multilateral process operating under the aegis of the WTO as the exclusive forum for WTO adjudication. Intuitively, one would expect that those ...
Date:2015Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI RSCAS; 2015/34; Global Governance Programme-169; Global EconomicsAbstract:The WTO Dispute Settlement System aimed to curb unilateralism by establishing a multilateral process operating under the aegis of the WTO as the exclusive forum for WTO adjudication. Intuitively, one would expect that those ...
Title:A technical barriers to trade agreement for services? Author(s):HOEKMAN, Bernard M. ; MAVROIDIS, Petros C.Date:2015Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI RSCAS; 2015/25; Global Governance Programme-165; Global EconomicsAbstract:Services are regulated for a variety of reasons. Regulation is typically influenced by political economy forces and may thus at times reflect protectionist motivations. Similar considerations arise for goods, but the ...
; MAVROIDIS, Petros C.Date:2015Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI RSCAS; 2015/25; Global Governance Programme-165; Global EconomicsAbstract:Services are regulated for a variety of reasons. Regulation is typically influenced by political economy forces and may thus at times reflect protectionist motivations. Similar considerations arise for goods, but the ...
Title:Dispute settlement in the WTO (mind over matter) Author(s):MAVROIDIS, Petros C.Date:2016Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI RSCAS; 2016/14; Global Governance Programme-211; Global EconomicsAbstract:The basic point I advocate in this paper is that the WTO Dispute Settlement System aims to curb unilateralism. No sanctions can be imposed, unless if the arbitration process is through, the purpose of which is to ensure ...
Date:2016Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI RSCAS; 2016/14; Global Governance Programme-211; Global EconomicsAbstract:The basic point I advocate in this paper is that the WTO Dispute Settlement System aims to curb unilateralism. No sanctions can be imposed, unless if the arbitration process is through, the purpose of which is to ensure ...
Title:Free markets, state involvement, and the WTO : Chinese state owned enterprises (SOEs) in the ring Author(s):MAVROIDIS, Petros C.; JANOW, Merit E.Date:2017Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI RSCAS; 2017/13; Global Governance Programme-256; Global EconomicsAbstract:The WTO has struggled with the treatment of nonmarket economies (NMEs). What was a nonissue in the original GATT (because of the homogeneity of participants) became quite an issue with the accession of formally centrally ...
; JANOW, Merit E.Date:2017Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI RSCAS; 2017/13; Global Governance Programme-256; Global EconomicsAbstract:The WTO has struggled with the treatment of nonmarket economies (NMEs). What was a nonissue in the original GATT (because of the homogeneity of participants) became quite an issue with the accession of formally centrally ...