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dc.contributor.authorLACEY, Joseph
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-20T11:42:03Z
dc.date.available2012-02-20T11:42:03Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.identifier.citationPhenomenology and the cognitive sciences, 2013, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 51- 73en
dc.identifier.issn1572-8676
dc.identifier.issn1568-7759
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/20498
dc.descriptionPublished online 14 December 2011en
dc.description.abstractTerry Horgan and Mark Simmons’ work implies four criteria that moral phenomenology must be capable of meeting if it is to be a viable field of study that can make a worthwhile contribution to moral philosophy. It must be (a) about a unified subject matter as well as being, (b) wide, (c) independent, and (d) robust. Contrary to some scepticism about the possibility or usefulness of this field, I suggest that these criteria can be met by elucidating the very foundations of moral experience or what I call a moral ontology of the human person. I attempt to partially outline such an ontology by engaging with Robert Sokolowski's phenomenology of the human person from a moral perspective. My analysis of Sokolowski's thought leads me to five core ideas of a moral ontology of the human person: well-being, virtue, freedom, responsibility, and phronesis. Though I do not by any means boast a complete moral ontology of the human person, I go on to demonstrate how the account I have presented, or something like it, can go a long way to helping moral phenomenology meet the criteria it requires to be a viable and worthwhile pursuit.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofPhenomenology and the cognitive sciencesen
dc.titleMoral phenomenology and a moral ontology of the human personen
dc.typeArticleen
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s11097-011-9249-4
dc.identifier.volume12en
dc.identifier.startpage51en
dc.identifier.endpage73en
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dc.identifier.issue1en
dc.twitterfalse


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