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dc.contributor.authorALLEN, Franklin
dc.contributor.authorCARLETTI, Elena
dc.contributor.authorLEONELLO, Agnese
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-28T10:02:20Z
dc.date.available2012-02-28T10:02:20Z
dc.date.issued2011
dc.identifier.citationOxford Review of Economic Policy, 2011, 27, 3, 464-478en
dc.identifier.issn1460-2121
dc.identifier.issn0266-903X
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/20655
dc.description.abstractWe review the theory of deposit insurance, highlighting the underlying assumptions that were not satisfied during the recent financial crisis and that may have led to serious policy mistakes. In theoretical models, deposit insurance is mostly seen as an equilibrium selection device to avoid panic-based runs. In such a context, it is not drawn on and is thus costless and fully credible. However, if bank runs are linked to a fall in asset values, providing deposit insurance can be very costly and, as the case of Ireland has shown, can even threaten sovereign solvency. This perspective indicates a need for new research on the relation between bank failures, deposit insurance schemes, sovereign default, and currency depreciation, and for reforms of deposit insurance schemes.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofOxford Review of Economic Policyen
dc.titleDeposit Insurance and Risk Takingen
dc.typeArticleen
dc.identifier.doi10.1093/oxrep/grr022
dc.neeo.contributorALLEN|Franklin|aut|
dc.neeo.contributorCARLETTI|Elena|aut|EUI70001
dc.neeo.contributorLEONELLO|Agnese|aut|
dc.identifier.volume27en


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