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dc.contributor.authorGIANI, Leonardo
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-28T10:28:47Z
dc.date.available2012-02-28T10:28:47Z
dc.date.issued2011
dc.identifier.citationColumbia Journal of European Law, 2011, 18, 1, onlineen
dc.identifier.issn1076-6715
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/20656
dc.description.abstractThe regulatory response to the financial crisis has necessitated (and it still is necessitating) the adoption of a vast array of legal reforms. However, some of the elements of these reforms have departed from their originally intended design. One example of such departures comes from the United States. Commenting on the rule named after him, following the adoption of the Dodd-Frank Act, Paul Volcker stated that “[I]t doesn’t have the purity I was searching for." This paper aims to show that this outcome is not unique to the American experience. In fact, on the other side of the Atlantic, deviations have also occurred during the process that has led to the establishment of the European System of Financial Supervision (“ESFS”) and they have made it more complex than it was initially contemplated.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.urihttp://www.cjel.net/online/18_1-giani/en
dc.titleThe Tortuous Path to the European System of Financial Supervisionen
dc.typeArticleen


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