Technology Investment and Alternative Regulatory Regimes with Demand Uncertainty

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Show simple item record CAMBINI, Carlo SILVESTRI, Virginia 2012-04-02T09:16:41Z 2012-04-02T09:16:41Z 2012
dc.identifier.issn 1028-3625
dc.description.abstract A vertically integrated incumbent and an OLO (Other Licensed Operator) dynamically compete in the market for broadband access. The incumbent has the option to invest in building a Next Generation Network that covers all urban areas with similar demand structures. The investment return in terms of demand increase is uncertain. We compare the impact of different access price regulation regimes - full regulation, partial regulation (only the copper network is regulated), risk sharing - on investment incentives and social welfare. We find that, compared to Foros (2004), the OLO gets better access condition in case of partial regulation and exclusion does not necessarily happen in equilibrium even if the incumbent has more ability than the OLO. Moreover, risk sharing emerges as the most preferable regime both from a consumer and a social welfare perspective for a large range of parameters. en
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso en en
dc.relation.ispartofseries EUI RSCAS en
dc.relation.ispartofseries 2012/15 en
dc.relation.ispartofseries Florence School of Regulation en
dc.rights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subject Investment en
dc.subject Regulation en
dc.subject Access pricing en
dc.subject New Technology en
dc.subject Risk Sharing en
dc.subject L51 en
dc.subject L96 en
dc.title Technology Investment and Alternative Regulatory Regimes with Demand Uncertainty en
dc.type Working Paper en
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