Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorCAMBINI, Carlo
dc.contributor.authorSILVESTRI, Virginia
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-02T09:16:41Z
dc.date.available2012-04-02T09:16:41Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.identifier.issn1028-3625
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/21477
dc.description.abstractA vertically integrated incumbent and an OLO (Other Licensed Operator) dynamically compete in the market for broadband access. The incumbent has the option to invest in building a Next Generation Network that covers all urban areas with similar demand structures. The investment return in terms of demand increase is uncertain. We compare the impact of different access price regulation regimes - full regulation, partial regulation (only the copper network is regulated), risk sharing - on investment incentives and social welfare. We find that, compared to Foros (2004), the OLO gets better access condition in case of partial regulation and exclusion does not necessarily happen in equilibrium even if the incumbent has more ability than the OLO. Moreover, risk sharing emerges as the most preferable regime both from a consumer and a social welfare perspective for a large range of parameters.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI RSCASen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2012/15en
dc.relation.ispartofseriesFlorence School of Regulationen
dc.relation.hasversionhttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/31179
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subjectInvestmenten
dc.subjectRegulationen
dc.subjectAccess pricingen
dc.subjectNew Technologyen
dc.subjectRisk Sharingen
dc.subjectL51en
dc.subjectL96en
dc.titleTechnology Investment and Alternative Regulatory Regimes with Demand Uncertaintyen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
eui.subscribe.skiptrue


Files in this item

Icon

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record