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dc.contributor.authorIARYCZOWER, Matias
dc.contributor.authorMATTOZZI, Andrea
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-17T15:07:31Z
dc.date.available2012-04-17T15:07:31Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.identifier.citationEconomic Theory, 2012, 49, 3, 591-619en
dc.identifier.issn0938-2259
dc.identifier.issn1432-0479
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/21620
dc.description.abstractWe study a model of elections in non-majoritarian systems that captures the link between competition in policies and competition in campaign spending. We argue that the overall competitiveness of the political arena depends on both the endogenous number of parties contesting the election and the endogenous level of campaign spending. These two dimensions are linked together through their combined effect on the total equilibrium level of political rents. We illustrate the key insights of the model with an analysis of the competitive effects of campaign spending limits. We show that under some conditions spending caps can be pro-competitive, leading to an increase in the number of parties contesting the elections.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofEconomic Theoryen
dc.subjectCampaign spending
dc.subjectElections
dc.subjectCampaign limits
dc.subjectPolitical parties
dc.subjectD72
dc.subjectD78
dc.subjectC72
dc.titleThe Pro-Competitive Effect of Campaign Limits in Non-Majoritarian Electionsen
dc.typeArticleen
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s00199-011-0613-y
dc.neeo.contributorIARYCZOWER|Matias|aut|
dc.neeo.contributorMATTOZZI|Andrea|aut|EUI70017
dc.identifier.volume49en


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