The Pro-Competitive Effect of Campaign Limits in Non-Majoritarian Elections

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dc.contributor.author IARYCZOWER, Matias
dc.contributor.author MATTOZZI, Andrea
dc.date.accessioned 2012-04-17T15:07:31Z
dc.date.available 2012-04-17T15:07:31Z
dc.date.issued 2012
dc.identifier.citation Economic Theory, 2012, 49, 3, 591-619 en
dc.identifier.issn 0938-2259
dc.identifier.issn 1432-0479
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/1814/21620
dc.description.abstract We study a model of elections in non-majoritarian systems that captures the link between competition in policies and competition in campaign spending. We argue that the overall competitiveness of the political arena depends on both the endogenous number of parties contesting the election and the endogenous level of campaign spending. These two dimensions are linked together through their combined effect on the total equilibrium level of political rents. We illustrate the key insights of the model with an analysis of the competitive effects of campaign spending limits. We show that under some conditions spending caps can be pro-competitive, leading to an increase in the number of parties contesting the elections. en
dc.language.iso en en
dc.relation.ispartof Economic Theory en
dc.subject Campaign spending
dc.subject Elections
dc.subject Campaign limits
dc.subject Political parties
dc.subject D72
dc.subject D78
dc.subject C72
dc.title The Pro-Competitive Effect of Campaign Limits in Non-Majoritarian Elections en
dc.type Article en
dc.identifier.doi 10.1007/s00199-011-0613-y
dc.neeo.contributor IARYCZOWER|Matias|aut|
dc.neeo.contributor MATTOZZI|Andrea|aut|EUI70017
dc.identifier.volume 49 en


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