Old "foundations" and new "rules" for an enlarged European Union
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Vienna, European Community Studies Association-Austria (ECSA), 1997
European integration online papers; 1997/01
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SCHMITTER, Philippe C., TORREBLANCA, José Ignacio, Old ‘foundations’ and new ‘rules’ for an enlarged European Union, Vienna, European Community Studies Association-Austria (ECSA), 1997, European integration online papers, 1997/01 - https://hdl.handle.net/1814/21984
Abstract
This paper presents a novel arrangement for the distribution of votes and the rules of decision-making in an enlarged European Union (EU). We make two assumptions: (1) that the EU is condemned to enlarge its membership in the near future; and (2) if it does this without changing the existing rules for voting in the Council of Ministers and distributing seats in the European Parliament, such an expanded EU would suffer severe distortions and disequilibria. However, if it were to adopt a new, simplified system that would combine arrangements for proportional proportionality in representation and concurrent majorities in decision-making, this impending dilemma could be avoided. Moreover, if these reforms were introduced sooner rather than later, they would be easier to agree upon, their impact would be phased in gradually, and their legitimacy could be stabilized in the face of far greater challenges in the future.
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Digitised version produced by the EUI Library and made available online in 2020.