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dc.contributor.authorSCHMITTER, Philippe C.
dc.contributor.authorTORREBLANCA, José Ignacio
dc.identifier.citationVienna, European Community Studies Association-Austria (ECSA), 1997en
dc.description.abstractThis paper presents a novel arrangement for the distribution of votes and the rules of decision-making in an enlarged European Union (EU). We make two assumptions: (1) that the EU is condemned to enlarge its membership in the near future; and (2) if it does this without changing the existing rules for voting in the Council of Ministers and distributing seats in the European Parliament, such an expanded EU would suffer severe distortions and disequilibria. However, if it were to adopt a new, simplified system that would combine arrangements for proportional proportionality in representation and concurrent majorities in decision-making, this impending dilemma could be avoided. Moreover, if these reforms were introduced sooner rather than later, they would be easier to agree upon, their impact would be phased in gradually, and their legitimacy could be stabilized in the face of far greater challenges in the future.en
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEuropean integration online papersen
dc.titleOld "Foundations" and New "Rules" for an Enlarged European Unionen
dc.typeWorking Paperen

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