Old "Foundations" and New "Rules" for an Enlarged European Union

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dc.contributor.author SCHMITTER, Philippe C.
dc.contributor.author TORREBLANCA, José Ignacio
dc.date.accessioned 2012-05-16T15:46:48Z
dc.date.available 2012-05-16T15:46:48Z
dc.date.issued 1997
dc.identifier.citation Vienna, European Community Studies Association-Austria (ECSA), 1997 en
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/1814/21984
dc.description.abstract This paper presents a novel arrangement for the distribution of votes and the rules of decision-making in an enlarged European Union (EU). We make two assumptions: (1) that the EU is condemned to enlarge its membership in the near future; and (2) if it does this without changing the existing rules for voting in the Council of Ministers and distributing seats in the European Parliament, such an expanded EU would suffer severe distortions and disequilibria. However, if it were to adopt a new, simplified system that would combine arrangements for proportional proportionality in representation and concurrent majorities in decision-making, this impending dilemma could be avoided. Moreover, if these reforms were introduced sooner rather than later, they would be easier to agree upon, their impact would be phased in gradually, and their legitimacy could be stabilized in the face of far greater challenges in the future. en
dc.language.iso en en
dc.relation.ispartofseries European integration online papers en
dc.relation.ispartofseries 1997/01 en
dc.relation.uri http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1997-001a.htm en
dc.title Old "Foundations" and New "Rules" for an Enlarged European Union en
dc.type Working Paper en

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