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dc.contributor.authorLUQUE, Jaime
dc.contributor.authorMORELLI, Massimo
dc.contributor.authorTAVARES, José
dc.date.accessioned2012-05-17T09:45:57Z
dc.date.available2012-05-17T09:45:57Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.identifier.issn1028-3625
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/21988
dc.description.abstractIn a setting where heterogeneous jurisdictions share a common policy, an increase in volatility breaks unanimous support for the status-quo and may prompt a subset of jurisdictions to favor either deepening the agreement through a fiscal union, or revert to autarky. A reassignment of political weights in the fiscal union may restore unanimous support for the common policy. We show how the bargaining space depends on relative country income, size, and cross country correlation of shocks. Finally, we discuss the future of a common currency in Europe and the different emphasis member countries have put on the choice of fiscal federalism versus autarky.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI RSCASen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2012/21en
dc.relation.ispartofseriesGlobal Governance Programme-17en
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subjectFiscal Unionen
dc.subjectCommon currencyen
dc.subjectAutarkyen
dc.subjectBargaining spaceen
dc.subjectVoting Weightsen
dc.subjectHeterogeneous countriesen
dc.subjectD70en
dc.subjectD78en
dc.subjectE62en
dc.subjectF15en
dc.subjectH77en
dc.titleA Volatility-based Theory of Fiscal Union Formationen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
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