Three Stages in the Use of Cost-benefit Analysis as a Tool for Evaluating U.S. Regulatory Policy

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dc.contributor.author LIVERMORE, Michael A.
dc.contributor.author REVESZ, Richard L.
dc.date.accessioned 2012-07-12T14:46:03Z
dc.date.available 2012-07-12T14:46:03Z
dc.date.issued 2012
dc.identifier.issn 1830-7736
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/1814/22774
dc.description The lecture was delivered by Richard L. Revesz on 20 June 2012. en
dc.description.abstract Over the last thirty years a three-stage evolution has taken place in American politics with regard to the use of cost-benefit analysis as a tool for evaluating regulation. During that time, the appeal of costbenefit analysis has shifted from one side of the aisle to the other. In the first stage, in the early 1980s, the Republican Party adopted cost-benefit analysis as a way of constraining regulation. Many progressive groups fought back by rejecting cost-benefit analysis altogether. Several years ago, in a second stage, some progressive groups finally started to speak the language of cost-benefit analysis and it looked like a consensus approach might emerge. But the economic crisis of 2008 has led the way to a third stage in which conservatives, who began to realize that cost-benefit analysis could justify stringent regulation, reframed the debate to one about jobs. The essay argues that, despite pleas to abandon the technique, cost-benefit analysis has proven robust, in part because it provides a common ground where all interests are given weight. en
dc.language.iso en en
dc.relation.ispartofseries EUI MWP LS en
dc.relation.ispartofseries 2012/05 en
dc.subject Regulation en
dc.subject cost-benefit analysis en
dc.subject economic crisis en
dc.subject job analysis en
dc.title Three Stages in the Use of Cost-benefit Analysis as a Tool for Evaluating U.S. Regulatory Policy en
dc.type Other en


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