Strategic Campaigning with Vote and Turnout Buying: Theory and evidence

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Show simple item record CASAS, Agustin 2012-07-12T14:54:07Z 2012-07-12T14:54:07Z 2012
dc.identifier.issn 1830-7728
dc.description.abstract In this paper, I model the relationship between potential voters and a politician, who can pay citizens to vote for him – vote buying – or to show up to vote – turnout buying. This model is used to explore the optimal budget allocation across districts, focusing on single-member majoritarian elections in a multi-district environment in which only the incumbent can engage in vote and turnout buying. The results enrich the distributive politics literature by showing that a campaign with direct voting is optimally focused on the opposition strongholds, rather than on swing or core states. I need strong evidence for this result using Argentinian electoral data disaggregated at the booth level, and spending data from a poverty relief program. I show that in the month prior to the 2003 Argentine presidential election, the incumbent party spent more money on groups that were ideologically skewed toward the opposition. Consequently, those districts turned out more, and voted more for the incumbent, who had transferred the money. Furthermore, to isolate actual campaign spending from campaign promises, I use Argentina's 2001 economic and political turmoil as a natural experiment. The empirical evidence confirms that in a single-member district election without an electoral college the incumbent candidate allocates more resources where the marginal cost per vote is lower, that is, in opposition strongholds. en
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso en en
dc.relation.ispartofseries EUI MWP en
dc.relation.ispartofseries 2012/15 en
dc.rights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subject Vote buying en
dc.subject voting model en
dc.subject political economy en
dc.subject strategic campaigning en
dc.subject distributive politics en
dc.title Strategic Campaigning with Vote and Turnout Buying: Theory and evidence en
dc.type Working Paper en
dc.neeo.contributor CASAS|Agustin|aut|
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