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dc.contributor.authorVALASEK, Justin Mattias
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-05T13:54:54Z
dc.date.available2012-09-05T13:54:54Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.identifier.issn1830-7728
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/23425
dc.description.abstractTurnout is an important determinant of which candidate wins an election. Since candidates know this, it follows that they will consider turnout when choosing their policy platforms. In this paper I formally examine the effect voter turnout has on candidates' policy positions by characterizing the equilibrium policy choices of candidates given the subsequent equilibrium turnout. I show that alienation among extreme voters, which occurs only when citizens' utility over policy is convex or linear, is a necessary condition for divergent, positive-turnout equilibria. My model suggests that candidate polarization is correlated with the importance of the election outcome and, counterintuitively, predicts that the level of turnout can increase with the cost of voting.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI MWPen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2012/18en
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subjectVoter turnouten
dc.subjectpolicy separationen
dc.subjectD72en
dc.titleTurnout and Policy: The role of candidatesen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.neeo.contributorVALASEK|Justin Mattias|aut|
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