Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorEBERL, Jakob
dc.contributor.authorJUS, Darko
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-14T11:43:57Z
dc.date.available2012-09-14T11:43:57Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.identifier.issn1028-3625
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/23775
dc.description.abstractThis paper describes how limited liability leads to risk-loving behaviour in nuclear power companies and unsafe nuclear power plants. By reviewing current regulatory regimes, we show that this issue is not being sufficiently addressed today. Therefore, we evaluate five regulatory instruments: (1) safety regulation, (2) minimum equity requirements, (3) mandatory insurance, (4) risk-sharing pools, and (5) catastrophe bonds. We conclude that none of these instruments in its pure form can be recommended. Thus, we propose a new approach that, in its core, consists of a two-stage procedure. In the first stage, capital markets assess the risk stemming from each nuclear power plant via catastrophe bonds. In the second step, the regulator uses this private risk assessment and intervenes by charging an actuarially fair premium in the form of a Pigouvian risk fee. Society ultimately acts as an explicit insurer for nuclear risk and is, on average, fairly compensated for the risk it is taking over.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI RSCASen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2012/50en
dc.relation.ispartofseriesLoyola de Palacio Programme on Energy Policyen
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subjectnuclear risk-takingen
dc.subjectlimited liabilityen
dc.subjectcatastrophe bondsen
dc.titleEvaluating Policies to Attain the Optimal Exposure to Nuclear Risken
dc.typeWorking Paperen
eui.subscribe.skiptrue


Files in this item

Icon

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record