Incomplete Information about Social Preferences Explains Equal Division and Delay in Bargaining

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dc.contributor.author KOHLER, Stefan
dc.date.accessioned 2012-09-14T15:06:29Z
dc.date.available 2012-09-14T15:06:29Z
dc.date.issued 2012
dc.identifier.citation Games, 2012, 3, 3, 119-137 en
dc.identifier.issn 2073-4336
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/1814/23782
dc.description Received: 30 July 2012; in revised form: 23 August 2012 / Accepted: 27 August 2012 / Published: 13 September 2012. (Contains revised content based on author's EUI PhD thesis, 2007.) http://hdl.handle.net/1814/7015 en
dc.description.abstract Two deviations of alternating-offer bargaining behavior from economic theory are observed together, yet have been studied separately. Players who could secure themselves a large surplus share if bargainers were purely self-interested incompletely exploit their advantage. Delay in agreement occurs even if all experimentally controlled information is common knowledge. This paper rationalizes both regularities coherently by modeling heterogeneous social preferences, either self-interest or envy, of one bargaining party as private information in a three period game of bargaining and preference screening and signaling. en
dc.language.iso en en
dc.relation.ispartof Games en
dc.relation.isversionof http://hdl.handle.net/1814/7015
dc.relation.uri http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/3/3/119 en
dc.title Incomplete Information about Social Preferences Explains Equal Division and Delay in Bargaining en
dc.type Article en
dc.identifier.doi 10.3390/g3030119
dc.neeo.contributor KOHLER|Stefan|aut|
dc.identifier.volume 3 en


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