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dc.contributor.authorKOHLER, Stefan
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-14T15:06:29Z
dc.date.available2012-09-14T15:06:29Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.identifier.citationGames, 2012, 3, 3, 119-137en
dc.identifier.issn2073-4336
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/23782
dc.descriptionReceived: 30 July 2012; in revised form: 23 August 2012 / Accepted: 27 August 2012 / Published: 13 September 2012. (Contains revised content based on author's EUI PhD thesis, 2007.) http://hdl.handle.net/1814/7015en
dc.description.abstractTwo deviations of alternating-offer bargaining behavior from economic theory are observed together, yet have been studied separately. Players who could secure themselves a large surplus share if bargainers were purely self-interested incompletely exploit their advantage. Delay in agreement occurs even if all experimentally controlled information is common knowledge. This paper rationalizes both regularities coherently by modeling heterogeneous social preferences, either self-interest or envy, of one bargaining party as private information in a three period game of bargaining and preference screening and signaling.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofGamesen
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/7015
dc.relation.urihttp://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/3/3/119en
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.titleIncomplete Information about Social Preferences Explains Equal Division and Delay in Bargainingen
dc.typeArticleen
dc.identifier.doi10.3390/g3030119
dc.neeo.contributorKOHLER|Stefan|aut|
dc.identifier.volume3en
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