Information Disclosure and the Equivalence of Prospective Payment and Cost Reimbursement

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dc.contributor.author MA, Ching-to Albert
dc.contributor.author MAK, Henry Y.
dc.date.accessioned 2012-09-21T10:17:44Z
dc.date.available 2012-09-21T10:17:44Z
dc.date.issued 2012
dc.identifier.issn 1830-7728
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/1814/23897
dc.description.abstract A health care provider chooses medical service quality and cost-reduction effort. Both choices are non-contractible. An insurer observes both quality and cost effort, and may credibly disclose them to consumers. In prospective payment, the insurer fully discloses care quality, and sets a prospective payment price. In cost reimbursement, the insurer discloses a value index, a weighted average of quality and cost effort, and pays a margin above cost. The first-best quality and cost effort can be implemented by prospective payment and by cost reimbursement. en
dc.language.iso en en
dc.relation.ispartofseries EUI MWP en
dc.relation.ispartofseries 2012/22 en
dc.subject Prospective payment en
dc.subject cost reimbursement en
dc.subject fee for service en
dc.subject quality en
dc.subject cost reduction en
dc.title Information Disclosure and the Equivalence of Prospective Payment and Cost Reimbursement en
dc.type Working Paper en
dc.neeo.contributor MA|Ching-to Albert|aut|
dc.neeo.contributor MAK|Henry Y.|aut|


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