Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorMA, Ching-to Albert
dc.contributor.authorMAK, Henry Y.
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-21T10:17:44Z
dc.date.available2012-09-21T10:17:44Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.identifier.issn1830-7728
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/23897
dc.description.abstractA health care provider chooses medical service quality and cost-reduction effort. Both choices are non-contractible. An insurer observes both quality and cost effort, and may credibly disclose them to consumers. In prospective payment, the insurer fully discloses care quality, and sets a prospective payment price. In cost reimbursement, the insurer discloses a value index, a weighted average of quality and cost effort, and pays a margin above cost. The first-best quality and cost effort can be implemented by prospective payment and by cost reimbursement.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI MWPen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2012/22en
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subjectProspective paymenten
dc.subjectcost reimbursementen
dc.subjectfee for serviceen
dc.subjectqualityen
dc.subjectcost reductionen
dc.titleInformation Disclosure and the Equivalence of Prospective Payment and Cost Reimbursementen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.neeo.contributorMA|Ching-to Albert|aut|
dc.neeo.contributorMAK|Henry Y.|aut|
eui.subscribe.skiptrue


Files in this item

Icon

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record