dc.contributor.author | MA, Ching-to Albert | |
dc.contributor.author | MAK, Henry Y. | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-09-21T10:17:44Z | |
dc.date.available | 2012-09-21T10:17:44Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2012 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1830-7728 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1814/23897 | |
dc.description.abstract | A health care provider chooses medical service quality and cost-reduction effort. Both choices are non-contractible. An insurer observes both quality and cost effort, and may credibly disclose them to consumers. In prospective payment, the insurer fully discloses care quality, and sets a prospective payment price. In cost reimbursement, the insurer discloses a value index, a weighted average of quality and cost effort, and pays a margin above cost. The first-best quality and cost effort can be implemented by prospective payment and by cost reimbursement. | en |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.language.iso | en | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | EUI MWP | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | 2012/22 | en |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | |
dc.subject | Prospective payment | en |
dc.subject | Cost reimbursement | en |
dc.subject | Fee for service | en |
dc.subject | Quality | en |
dc.subject | Cost reduction | en |
dc.title | Information disclosure and the equivalence of prospective payment and cost reimbursement | en |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
eui.subscribe.skip | true | |