| dc.contributor.author | MARCO COLINO, Sandra | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2012-09-28T12:08:16Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2012-09-28T12:08:16Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2009 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Oxford : Hart, 2009 | en |
| dc.identifier.isbn | 9781841138718 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1814/23985 | |
| dc.description.abstract | This book focuses on the current legal framework for vertical agreements in the EU and the US. Over the last ten years, antitrust rules governing these agreements have undergone thorough reform. In the EU, the old sector-specific block exemptions were replaced by Regulation 2790/99, applicable to all sectors of the economy. In addition, changes introduced to the procedural rules have led to the decentralisation of Article 81(3) and the removal of the notification requirement. In like manner, in the US the Supreme Court has gradually taken vertical restraints out of the per se illegality rule. What Sylvania achieved in placing non-price vertical restraints under the rule of reason in the late 1970s, the Khan judgment did for maximum resale price maintenance in 1997, whilst most recently and most significantly in 2007 the Leegin case followed suit for minimum resale price maintenance. | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | --Acknowledgements vii
--Note to the Reader ix
--Table of Cases xiii
--Table of Statutes xvii
--Introduction 1
--I The Significance of Vertical Agreements in the Study of Antitrust Policy and Regulation 1
--II Competition Law in a Time of Financial Turmoil 6
--III Competition and Regulation: An Impossible Relationship? The Challenges of Regulating Competition the Challenges of Regulating Competition 8
--IV Style, Structure and Methodology 11
--1 The Enduring Debate on the Nature of Vertical Agreements 15
--I The Intricacies of the Regulation of Vertical Agreements in Competion Law 15
--II The Regulatory Dilemma: General Assumptions on the 'Double Nature' of Vertical Restraints 19
--III The Adequacy of Competition Law in Addressing the Regulatory Dilemma 24
--2 Theorising Vertical Restraints: The Intellectual Foundations of EC Competition Law and US Antitrust Models 35
--I The Influence of Economic and Political Theory in the Evolution of the Legal Framework for Vertical Agreements 35
--II Vertical Restraints and Wider Competition Policy—An Overview 46
--3 Questioning the Achievement of an Adequate Economic Analysis 75
--I The Progressive Disappearance of the Per Se Rule in the US 76
--II The European Regime for Vertical Agreements Since 1999 92
--III An Assessment: Inherent Benefits and Dangers in the Extension of the Rule of Reason 145
--4 The Impact of Competition Rules on Vertical Contractual Relationships 153
--I The Interaction Between Contract and Competition Law 157
--II Rebalancing the Dealer—Manufacturer Relationship 169
--III The Path Towards the Reconciliation of the Evolution of Contract and Competition Law 178
--Conclusions 183
--I Explanations: Vertical Agreements and Antitrust Law 183
--II Predictions and Suggestions 188
--III Final Evaluation—Assuming the Law's Limits 191
--Index 195 | en |
| dc.language.iso | en | en |
| dc.publisher | Hart | en |
| dc.relation.isversionof | http://hdl.handle.net/1814/7020 | en |
| dc.title | Vertical agreements and competition law : a comparative study of the EU and US regimes | en |
| dc.type | Book | en |
| eui.subscribe.skip | true | |
| dc.description.version | Published version of EUI PhD thesis, 2007 | en |
