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dc.contributor.authorAUSTER, Sarah
dc.date.accessioned2012-11-05T16:23:28Z
dc.date.available2012-11-05T16:23:28Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.identifier.issn1725-6704
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/24274
dc.description.abstractThis paper introduces asymmetric awareness into the classical principal-agent model and discusses the optimal contract between a fully aware principal and an unaware agent. The principal enlarges the agent’s awareness strategically when proposing the contract. He faces a trade-off between participation and incentives. Leaving the agent unaware allows him to exploit the agent’s incomplete understanding of the world. Making the agent aware enables the principal to use the revealed contingencies as signals about the agent’s action choice. The optimal contract reveals contingencies that have low probability but are highly informative about the agent’s effort.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI ECOen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2012/23en
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subjectUnawarenessen
dc.subjectMoral Hazarden
dc.subjectIncomplete Contractsen
dc.subjectD01en
dc.subjectD83en
dc.subjectD86en
dc.titleAsymmetric Awareness and Moral Hazzarden
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.neeo.contributorAUSTER|Sarah|aut|
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