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dc.contributor.authorSOBBRIO, Francesco
dc.date.accessioned2012-11-22T17:06:53Z
dc.date.available2012-11-22T17:06:53Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.identifier.issn1028-3625
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/24535
dc.description.abstractThis paper provides a model of the market for news where profit-maximizing media outlets choose their editors from a population of rational citizens. The analysis identifies a novel mechanism of media bias: the bias in a media outlet's news reports is the result of the slanted endogenous information acquisition strategy of its editor. Accordingly, the results show that citizens find it optimal to acquire information from a media outlet whose editor has similar ideological preferences. At the same time, there is always an upper bound on the possible “extremism” of an editor above which the citizens' demand for news is strictly decreasing. Depending on the distribution of citizens' ideological preferences, a media outlet may choose an ideological editor even in a monopolistic market. Moreover, ideological editors are more likely to be present in the market for news: i) the higher the number of media outlets competing in the market for news; ii) the lower the opportunity cost that citizens have to incur to acquire information.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI RSCASen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2012/61en
dc.relation.ispartofseriesFlorence School of Regulationen
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subjectD81en
dc.subjectD83en
dc.subjectL82en
dc.subjectMedia Biasen
dc.subjectSlanten
dc.subjectInformation Acquisitionen
dc.subjectValenceen
dc.subjectCompetitionen
dc.titleA Citizen-Editors Model of News Mediaen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
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