A Citizen-Editors Model of News Media

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dc.contributor.author SOBBRIO, Francesco
dc.date.accessioned 2012-11-22T17:06:53Z
dc.date.available 2012-11-22T17:06:53Z
dc.date.issued 2012
dc.identifier.issn 1028-3625
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/1814/24535
dc.description.abstract This paper provides a model of the market for news where profit-maximizing media outlets choose their editors from a population of rational citizens. The analysis identifies a novel mechanism of media bias: the bias in a media outlet's news reports is the result of the slanted endogenous information acquisition strategy of its editor. Accordingly, the results show that citizens find it optimal to acquire information from a media outlet whose editor has similar ideological preferences. At the same time, there is always an upper bound on the possible “extremism” of an editor above which the citizens' demand for news is strictly decreasing. Depending on the distribution of citizens' ideological preferences, a media outlet may choose an ideological editor even in a monopolistic market. Moreover, ideological editors are more likely to be present in the market for news: i) the higher the number of media outlets competing in the market for news; ii) the lower the opportunity cost that citizens have to incur to acquire information. en
dc.language.iso en en
dc.relation.ispartofseries EUI RSCAS en
dc.relation.ispartofseries 2012/61 en
dc.relation.ispartofseries Florence School of Regulation en
dc.subject D81 en
dc.subject D83 en
dc.subject L82 en
dc.subject Media Bias en
dc.subject Slant en
dc.subject Information Acquisition en
dc.subject Valence en
dc.subject Competition en
dc.title A Citizen-Editors Model of News Media en
dc.type Working Paper en


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