Two Concepts of Religious Freedom in the European Court of Human Rights

DSpace/Manakin Repository

Show simple item record

dc.contributor.author BHUTA, Nehal
dc.date.accessioned 2012-12-05T16:44:21Z
dc.date.available 2012-12-05T16:44:21Z
dc.date.issued 2012
dc.identifier.issn 1725-6739
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/1814/24678
dc.description.abstract This paper considers the way in which recent historical work on the history of freedom of religion and freedom of conscience opens up a new interpretation of the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in the headscarf cases. These decisions have been widely criticized as adopting a militantly secularist approach to the presence of Islamic religious symbols in the public sphere, an approach that seems inconsistent or even overtly discriminatory in light of the court’s recent decision in Lautsi that the compulsory display of crucifixes in the classroom did not breach Italy’s convention obligations. I argue that the headscarf cases turn less on the balance between state neutrality and religious belief, than on an understanding of certain religious symbols as a threat to public order and as harbingers of sectarian strife which undermine democracy. en
dc.language.iso en en
dc.relation.ispartofseries EUI LAW en
dc.relation.ispartofseries 2012/33 en
dc.subject freedom of religion en
dc.subject European Court of Human Rights en
dc.subject secularism en
dc.subject public order en
dc.subject headscarf en
dc.title Two Concepts of Religious Freedom in the European Court of Human Rights en
dc.type Working Paper en


Files in this item

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record