Two Concepts of Religious Freedom in the European Court of Human Rights

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Show simple item record BHUTA, Nehal 2012-12-05T16:44:21Z 2012-12-05T16:44:21Z 2012
dc.identifier.issn 1725-6739
dc.description.abstract This paper considers the way in which recent historical work on the history of freedom of religion and freedom of conscience opens up a new interpretation of the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in the headscarf cases. These decisions have been widely criticized as adopting a militantly secularist approach to the presence of Islamic religious symbols in the public sphere, an approach that seems inconsistent or even overtly discriminatory in light of the court’s recent decision in Lautsi that the compulsory display of crucifixes in the classroom did not breach Italy’s convention obligations. I argue that the headscarf cases turn less on the balance between state neutrality and religious belief, than on an understanding of certain religious symbols as a threat to public order and as harbingers of sectarian strife which undermine democracy. en
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso en en
dc.relation.ispartofseries EUI LAW en
dc.relation.ispartofseries 2012/33 en
dc.rights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subject freedom of religion en
dc.subject European Court of Human Rights en
dc.subject secularism en
dc.subject public order en
dc.subject headscarf en
dc.title Two Concepts of Religious Freedom in the European Court of Human Rights en
dc.type Working Paper en
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