Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorALLEN, Franklin
dc.contributor.authorCARLETTI, Elena 
dc.date.accessioned2013-03-27T11:05:45Z
dc.date.available2013-03-27T11:05:45Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.identifier.issn1725-6704
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/26454
dc.description.abstractIn a model with bankruptcy costs and segmented deposit and equity markets, we endogenize the choice of bank and firm capital structure and the cost of equity and deposit finance. Despite risk neutrality, equity capital is more costly than deposits. When banks directly finance risky investments, they hold positive capital and diversify. When they make risky loans to firms, banks trade off the high cost of equity with the diversification benefits from a lower bankruptcy probability. When bankruptcy costs are high, banks use no capital and only lend to one sector. When these are low, banks hold capital and diversify.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI ECOen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2013/03en
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subjectDeposit financeen
dc.subjectBankruptcy costsen
dc.subjectBank diversificationen
dc.subjectG21en
dc.subjectG32en
dc.subjectG33en
dc.titleDeposits and bank capital structureen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.neeo.contributorALLEN|Franklin|aut|
dc.neeo.contributorCARLETTI|Elena|aut|EUI70001
eui.subscribe.skiptrue


Files in this item

Icon

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record