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dc.contributor.authorLAUKYTE, Migle
dc.date.accessioned2013-05-23T11:43:25Z
dc.date.available2013-05-23T11:43:25Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.identifier.issn1830-7728
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/27058
dc.description.abstractIn this paper I argue that robots, understood as artificially intelligent and autonomous entities, may one day be regarded as subjects of rights. The argument is built by looking at Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach, and especially its application to supporting animal entitlements: I draw an analogy between animals and robots by arguing that if what matters is not so much the inherent worth of a (human or non-human) agent, but what an agent is capable of doing so as to live a dignified life, then there is no reason why in the future robots should not have their capabilities recognized and protected as well. The paper unfolds this idea in detail, addressing two main objections to it and arguing that the capabilities approach might be the right way to deal with robots in the future.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI MWPen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2013/05en
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subjectArtificial intelligenceen
dc.subjectCapabilities approachen
dc.subjectRobotsen
dc.titleThe capabilities approach as a bridge between animals and robotsen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
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