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dc.contributor.authorNAKAGUMA, Marcos Y.
dc.date.accessioned2013-07-29T14:14:03Z
dc.date.available2013-07-29T14:14:03Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.identifier.issn1830-7728
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/27703
dc.description.abstractThis paper proposes a model to study the main factors that influence the preferences of different population groups between presidential and parliamentary systems. Our theory suggests that the parliamentary regime leads to a type of Öscal decentralization in the form of more transfers to constituencies. Ceteris paribus, the poor groups in the population tend to prefer a presidential system relatively more than the rich, since the lower quality of their local accountability institutions (e.g. local media and judicial courts) makes them more vulnerable to the expropriation of rents by their legislators. We also show that in order to perform adequately a parliamentary regime depends on the existence of a class of politicians that can be trusted to represent well the interests of voters. Our model is able to account for the main stylized facts emerging from an analysis of referendum data from Brazil.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI MWPen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2013/20en
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subjectPresidential systemen
dc.subjectParliamentary systemen
dc.subjectVoter preferencesen
dc.subjectRepresentationen
dc.titleChoosing the form of government : theory and evidence from Brazilen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
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